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The use and management of private land has a critical role to play in halting biodiversity 
loss, one of the key environmental challenges currently facing humanity. Voluntary incentive 
programs, where payments or other incentives are offered to landholders for the provision 
of environmental services, are widely used to increase conservation on private land. Despite 
large investments in conservation incentives globally, many outstanding knowledge gaps 
need to be addressed in order to support the future effectiveness of these programs. 
Firstly, evidence of ecological impacts is rare and has been confined to a subset of program 
types and locations. Furthermore, although there are large funding shortfalls for biodiversity 
conservation, opportunities to leverage resources from carbon markets remain largely 
unexplored in empirical research. In relation to incentive program participants, much 
previous research has been based on narrow assumptions of the types of landholders who 
participate. Currently, there is also limited knowledge of the factors supporting retention of 
participants and of what happens when incentive contracts end. 
In this thesis, these knowledge gaps are addressed using empirical data from a large scale 
conservation auction (incentive program). The program offered 5 or 10-year contracts to 
private landholders to protect and restore remnant native vegetation in South Australia’s 
agricultural regions. This research uses both quantitative and qualitative data in a 
multidisciplinary approach spanning field ecology, carbon sequestration modelling, 
economics and sociology.  
This research shows that incentive contracts for restoration of remnant native vegetation 
can produce biodiversity gains. Furthermore, it demonstrates that carbon markets could pay 
the cost of that restoration under plausible scenarios and conservative carbon prices. 
Absentee and group landholders were found to be important participant types, challenging 
the commonly held assumption that participants are generally resident individuals or 
families. The important role of restoration costs in participant retention and post-contract 
behaviour was also identified, indicating that restoration activities are unlikely to continue 
when incentive payments cease if the ongoing costs of restoration exceed the private 
benefits from participation. These findings clarify directions for future research and offer 







This thesis is presented in a format which follows the University of Adelaide guidelines for a 
thesis by publication. The introduction provides a brief background, literature overview and 
study aims for the research covered by the thesis. More detailed background information 
and literature review is provided in the individual introductions of each of the publication 
and manuscript chapters that follow. The introduction also provides descriptive information 
about the study region’s climate, land use and native vegetation as well as an outline of the 
BushBids program, the conservation incentive program used as a case study for this 
research. At the end of the introduction I have also listed the research outputs from this 
work. Chapters 2-5 contain two published papers, a manuscript submitted for review, and a 
manuscript prepared for submission. The concluding chapter provides a brief discussion 
linking the findings of the preceding chapters and giving recommendations for future 
research. Finally, references cited in the thesis introduction and conclusion are listed at the 





Chapter 1. Introduction and literature review  
Biodiversity loss is one of the most significant environmental challenges currently facing 
humanity (Convention on Biological Diversity, 2010; IPBES, 2019; Rockström et al., 2009). 
Biodiversity underpins the efficiency and stability of ecological functions such as biomass 
production and nutrient cycling and has been linked with the provision of ecosystem 
services that support the human population (Cardinale et al., 2012). However, biodiversity is 
declining at local and global scales (Butchart et al., 2010; Cardinale et al., 2018; IPBES, 2019; 
Newbold et al., 2015). Terrestrial biodiversity loss is driven by the loss, fragmentation and 
degradation of natural habitats (Pimm and Raven, 2000) often brought about by conversion 
to cultivated agricultural systems (MEA, 2005). Furthermore, even when large scale habitat 
clearance has ceased, decline in condition of remaining habitat is likely to continue (e.g. 
Fagúndez, 2013; Haddad et al., 2015; Laurance et al., 2012). 
Conservation targets to halt or reverse biodiversity loss, such as those under the UN 
Sustainable Development Goals, cannot be met by publicly governed protected areas alone 
(UNEP-WCMC and IUCN, 2016). Consequently, an important contribution is needed from 
private land (Figgis, 2004; Knight, 1999; Norton, 2000). However, the benefits produced by 
private land conservation are largely public benefits, while the costs are theoretically born 
by the private landholder (Doremus, 2003). This can mean that, for private landholders, 
adoption of conservation practices has a negative net benefit (benefit minus costs) and 
therefore private landholders are unlikely to adopt conservation practices without some 
form of policy intervention (Pannell, 2008). 
Offering payments to private landholders for the provision of environmental services 
through voluntary incentive programs is one approach widely employed to overcome 
adoption barriers (Doremus, 2003; Kamal et al., 2015). Voluntary incentive programs have 
been used to purchase a wide range of environmental services including sustainable 
agricultural practices, creation of set aside areas, restoration of natural habitats and 
conservation of threatened species and ecosystems (Kamal et al., 2015). Incentive contract 
length has commonly been set at around 5 years (e.g. Duncan and Vesk, 2013; Kleijn et al., 
2006) but has also extended to 10, 15 and 20 years (Kuhfuss et al., 2016). Incentive price can 
be set by the program in fixed-price schemes (e.g. European AES Batáry et al., 2015) or via 
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auctions in revealed-price schemes (e.g. Rolfe et al., 2017). While fixed-price schemes have 
been more commonly used, conservation auctions or tenders have potential advantages for 
efficiency, and are better able to deal with heterogeneity in management and opportunity 
costs (Rolfe et al., 2017; Stoneham et al., 2003; Windle and Rolfe, 2008).  
Globally, significant funding has been invested in conservation incentives over the last two 
decades (Batáry et al. 2015; Rolfe, Whitten & Windle 2017; Wu & Yu 2017). For example, 
the European Union contributed nearly €20 billion to Agri-Environmental Schemes between 
2007 and 2013 (European Commission, 2019), the annual rent paid under the US 
Conservation Reserve Program in 2018 was approximately USD$1.8 billion (USDA, 2018) and 
more than AU$170 million was allocated through Australian conservation tenders between 
2001 and 2016 (Rolfe et al., 2017). Despite these large investments, evidence of incentive 
program environmental impact remains rare (Ferraro, 2009). Furthermore, there are many 
remaining gaps in understanding participants and their interactions with incentive programs 
(e.g. Dayer et al., 2018; Petrzelka et al., 2012; Riley, 2016). 
In this thesis I examine four key knowledge gaps related to the design and performance of 
conservation incentive programs (Figure 1).  
i. Despite the growing understanding of farmers’ environmental behaviour (Burton, 
2014) and motivations for participating in incentive programs (e.g. Defrancesco et 
al., 2008), research to date has largely focused on one landholder type (resident 
farming individuals/families). However, understanding a broad range of participants 
is important for the design of effective programs. 
ii. Evidence of incentive program environmental impact is rare and has been confined 
to a subset of program types and locations (Ferraro, 2009; Ferraro and Pattanayak, 
2006). Impact evaluation for programs aiming to restore existing native vegetation 
and for revealed-price schemes is largely missing. 
iii. Currently there are large shortfalls in conservation funding (Waldron et al., 2017) 
and the potential to fund biodiversity conservation with carbon markets has not yet 
been explored. 
iv. Voluntary incentive program effectiveness depends on retention of participants and 
post-contract continuing conservation behaviour (Dayer et al., 2018; Selinske et al., 





considered the role of implementation costs in participant retention and post-
contract behaviour. 
In summary, there remains much to discover about how to achieve biodiversity gains, how 
to engage landholders and how to pay for conservation.  
The research presented in this thesis draws on a range of disciplines including ecology, 
carbon modelling, and social science, to address these knowledge gaps. It uses a large-scale, 
revealed-price, conservation incentive program, BushBids, as a case study. This program 
offered 5 or 10 year contracts to private landholders to restore remnant native vegetation. 
Under these contracts landholders agreed to manage grazing pressure (from stock and feral 
animals), control weeds and retain fallen logs. Below I provide more details about the 
research aims and approach for each study and give further detail of the BushBids program 
and the study environment. A data access agreement was made with O’Connor NRM Pty Ltd 
to enable the use of existing BushBids program data in this research (see Appendix 1). 
 
Figure 1 Conceptual diagram for conservation incentive programs where incentive 
payments are used to purchase environmental services from private landholders. Design of 
incentive policy can influence participation and should therefore be informed by knowledge 





































landholders aim to protect and restore biodiversity, but this has rarely been demonstrated 
(Study (ii)). Additional ecosystem services (co-benefits) may be produced, potentially 
offering a supplementary source of funding for incentive programs (Study (iii)). Little is 
currently known about participant experiences in incentive programs and how this may 
influence their future environmental behaviour (Study (iv)).  
 
Study (i) Who participates in conservation incentive programs? 
Absentee and group landholders are in the mix. 
Rural land ownership is diversifying in many regions, with growing numbers of amenity 
migrants (Cooke and Lane, 2015; Gosnell and Abrams, 2011) and absentee landholders 
(Mendham and Curtis, 2010; Petrzelka et al., 2013). Another contributor to the diversity of 
private land conservation participants are group landholders such as community groups, 
not-for-profit conservation organisations, and corporations (Fitzsimons, 2015; Gosnell and 
Travis, 2005; Selinske et al., 2015). However, studies of environmental behaviour in 
agricultural landscapes almost always conceptualise landholders as resident, farming 
individuals or families, both in empirical studies and reviews (e.g. Burton, 2014; Defrancesco 
et al., 2008; Hill et al., 2011; Perkins et al., 2013) and in economic choice experiments (e.g. 
Boxall et al., 2017; Wichmann et al., 2016). Only a small number of studies have considered 
absentee landholders (e.g.Lindhjem and Mitani, 2012; Petrzelka and Armstrong, 2015; 
Petrzelka et al., 2013; Petrzelka et al., 2012; Ulrich-Schad et al., 2016) and to date, group 
landholders as participants in conservation incentive programs have not been directly 
examined in the literature. 
Study (i) research aims 
This study aims to investigate the types of landholders who participate in conservation 
incentives, with particular reference to the role of absentee and group landholders.  
Study (i) approach 
This study characterises participants in the BushBids conservation incentive program (see 
further description below). A range of participant characteristics were examined, including 
participant involvement in primary production, whether they were resident or absentee and 





with Bayesian model averaging was used to test the relationships between these factors and 
the size of the area offered in the incentive program. Human research ethics approval was 
granted for this research (approval number H-2016-103, see Appendix 2).  
This work is presented in Chapter 2 and has been published in the journal Land Use Policy as 
Bond AJ, O'Connor PJ, Cavagnaro TR (2018) Who participates in conservation incentive 
programs? Absentee and group landholders are in the mix. Land Use Policy 72, 410-419 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2017.12.067 
 
Study (ii) Remnant woodland biodiversity gains under 10 years of 
revealed-price incentive payments 
Evidence of conservation incentive program effectiveness is needed to inform future 
investment and program design, but is difficult to measure and has been relatively rare 
(Ferraro, 2009; Kleijn and Sutherland, 2003; Mascia et al., 2014). Most research in this area 
has examined European Agri-Environmental Schemes, which have largely been fixed-price 
incentives for environment or biodiversity enhancing agricultural practices (see Batáry et al., 
2015), with little research from revealed-price incentives (e.g. Duncan and Vesk, 2013) and 
programs for restoration of remnant native vegetation (e.g. Lindenmayer et al., 2012a; 
Michael et al., 2014). While considerable efforts have been made to meet the challenges of 
monitoring large scale incentive programs, comprehensive Before-After-Control-Impact 
(BACI) designs (e.g. Bright et al., 2015) have rarely been used. Furthermore, only a small 
number of studies have examined ecological change over a period of ten years or longer 
(e.g. Riffell et al., 2008; Vesk et al., 2015).  
Study (ii) research aim 
This study aims to investigate the ecological outcomes from 10-year, revealed-price, 
incentive contracts. 
Study (ii) approach 
This study uses a modified before-after-control-impact design to examine the impact of 
incentive contracts from the Eastern Mt Lofty Ranges BushBids project. It tests whether 
impact sites (with contracts) changed over time relative to control sites (private land sites 
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without contracts) and reference sites (public reserves).  The study was conducted under a 
scientific research permit M26481-1 from the Department of Environment, Water and 
Natural Resources (see Appendix 3). 
This work is presented in Chapter 3 and is published in the Journal of Applied Ecology as 
Bond AJ, O'Connor PJ, Cavagnaro TR (2019) Remnant woodland biodiversity gains under 10 
years of revealed-price incentive payments. Journal of Applied Ecology 56, 1827-1838 
https://doi.org/10.1111/1365-2664.13397 
 
Study (iii) Carbon can pay the way for biodiversity conservation  
There are competing demands on land and financial resources for the provision of carbon 
sequestration and biodiversity conservation services (Smith et al., 2014; Waldron et al., 
2017). While carbon markets are beginning to provide a means to pay for climate mitigation 
(World Bank et al., 2017), there are few examples of similar regulatory mechanisms for 
biodiversity conservation (Madsen et al., 2010), despite large shortfalls in conservation 
funding (Waldron et al., 2017). The land-sector carbon abatement actions of avoided 
deforestation and reforestation have potential to provide concomitant carbon and 
biodiversity benefits thereby overcoming these resource constraints (Griscom et al., 2017). 
However, when these actions are optimised for carbon outcomes, biodiversity outcomes 
may be suboptimal or even negative (Ferreira et al., 2018; Lindenmayer et al., 2012b; Venter 
et al., 2009). The trade of carbon sequestered through restoration of remnant native 
vegetation may offer a way to fund restoration while optimising biodiversity outcomes from 
investment in carbon abatement. While this can be hypothesised it has not previously been 
possible to demonstrate due to the absence of evidence about the biodiversity gains from 
restoration and information about restoration costs.  
Study (iii) research aims 
This study aims to assess whether carbon could pay for biodiversity conservation, by trading 





Study (iii) approach 
Using FullCAM, the Australian Government’s carbon accounting tool, this study models 
carbon sequestered through restoration of remnant vegetation under 10-year incentive 
contracts. It uses plausible scenarios of vegetation age and ecosystem degradation rate 
along with two recent carbon prices from an established market. It compares the estimated 
revenue from sequestered carbon to the average cost of restoration revealed by the 
incentive program. 
This work is presented in Chapter 4 and has been submitted to Nature Ecology & Evolution. 
 
Study (iv) Money matters for retention and post-contract management 
persistence in conservation incentive programs 
The effectiveness of voluntary conservation incentive programs in part depends on retaining 
participants in the program (Knight et al., 2010; Selinske et al., 2015) and on what happens 
after incentive contracts end (Dayer et al., 2018). Dayer et al. (2018) used the term 
persistence for post-contract continuing conservation behaviour, and proposed a theory 
about enabling factors for persistence including cognitions, sustaining motivations, habit 
forming, social norms and resources. Like the initial decision to participate, retention and 
persistence are likely to be linked to the private net benefit (private benefits minus private 
costs) of implementing the incentivised conservation actions (Doremus, 2003; Engel et al., 
2008; Pannell, 2008). However, this framework of private benefits and costs has not been 
used to interpret findings in the small number of empirical studies in this area to date (e.g. 
Hayes, 2012; Kuhfuss et al., 2016; Race and Curtis, 2013). Furthermore the research has 
primarily focussed on fixed-price, cost-share or tax relief incentive programs with few 
studies exploring retention and persistence in revealed-price incentive programs (e.g. Race 
and Curtis, 2013). 
Study (iv) research aim 
This study aims to investigate retention and persistence in a revealed-price, conservation 
incentive program, and use this empirical evidence to evaluate the theory of post-contract 
persistence proposed by (Dayer et al., 2018). 
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Study (iv) approach 
This study uses data from semi-structured interviews and questionnaires conducted with 
incentive program participants at the conclusion of the 10-year incentive contract period. It 
utilises both quantitative and qualitative data, the latter analysed for content in NVivo 
software. Human research ethics approval was granted for this research (approval number 
H-2016-103, see Appendix 2). 
This work has been prepared as a manuscript in the format of Conservation Letters and is 
presented in Chapter 5. 
 
BushBids conservation incentive program 
The BushBids program (Australian Government, 2006) was established to assist private 
landholders in agricultural landscapes to maintain and restore the ecological function of 
remnant native vegetation on their property. It aimed to address past and potentially 
continuing declines in vegetation condition or ecological function, such as those identified 
by Duncan and Dorrough (2009) and Perring et al. (2015). The program used a series of 
discriminant price, reverse auctions to purchase 5 or 10-year stewardship contracts. In these 
auctions landholders submitted a single sealed bid for the price they would like to receive to 
deliver a contract. Successful bidders were then offered a contract at their bid price. Over 
the period from 2006 to 2013, there were five BushBids projects (see Figure 2) with a total 
of eight auction rounds that established stewardship contracts for more than 21,000 ha of 
native habitat. All but one of the chapters in this thesis focus on the first BushBids project in 
the eastern Mt Lofty Ranges. 
Participation was voluntary and landholders were recruited via the existing networks of 
government and non-government natural resources management organisations as well as 
advertising in local media. Landholders were invited to make an expression of interest in the 
program, after which a site visit was arranged for a BushBids representative to assess the 
native vegetation and prepare a management plan according to the landholder’s objectives 
and program policies (O’Connor et al., 2014). A total of 163 landholders expressed interest 





were established with 59 landholders, approximately one third of those that received 
management plans from the BushBids program. 
Management plans included a map of the native vegetation area/s offered in the program 
and outlined management actions intended to maintain or restore the condition or 
ecological function of the native vegetation (see Table 1). All management plans required 
retention of fallen logs (restriction on fire wood collection) and management of stock 
grazing (either stock exclusion, or in grassy ecosystems, conservative grazing regimes were 
allowed). At some sites, livestock were already excluded from the site prior to commencing 
the BushBids contract. 
An optional, additional bundle of actions to manage other threats at the sites was elected 
by most landholders. This bundle included weed and feral animal control along with other 
actions where applicable. Target weeds and feral animals varied according to climate and 
other environmental conditions, however lists of species commonly targeted for control in 
Eastern Mt Lofty Ranges BushBids management plans are provided in Table 2 and 3. 
Management of grazing pressure from Kangaroos (native) was also included in the 
management plan in some circumstances where this grazing pressure was considered to be 
a threat to the ecological function of the habitat. Native species planting was occasionally 
included in the management plan, as a means to restore highly degraded areas or to extend 
or link existing native vegetation. Finally, landholders were able to elect to enter into an in-
perpetuity conservation covenant, specifically a Heritage Agreement (Native Vegetation 
Council, 2017), as an additional service provided under the stewardship contract. 
A framework for monitoring and evaluation of management and ecological outcomes was 
built into the BushBids program design. Baseline vegetation assessments were completed 
for all participating landholders prior to bidding as well as at reference sites on public land. 
Contracted landholders where required to report annually on management activities and 
compliance auditing was undertaken throughout the contract period.  
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Table 1 Management actions identified in BushBids management plans 
Management action Compulsory 
/optional 
Minimise disturbance 
 No fertiliser application or artificial feeding,  
 No soil disturbance (beyond that which is necessary for 
agreed management actions),  
 No cropping,  
 No new dams,  
 No drainage alteration, and 
 No rock removal. 
Compulsory 
Retain dead trees, fallen logs and plant litter Compulsory 
Manage grazing pressure from stock 
 Exclude stock from the site at all times or  
 Periodic biomass reduction/conservation grazing in grassy 
ecosystems. All stock must be removed in late spring / early 
summer when perennial native grasses begin to flower. 
Conservative grazing can resume after seed on native 
perennial grasses has matured. 
Compulsory 






at the site 
Feral animal control 
Kangaroo control 
Supplementary planting 
Other threat management (e.g. prevent spread of Phytophthora 
cinnamomi, restrict vehicle access) 




Table 2 Weeds commonly targeted for control under Eastern Mt Lofty Ranges BushBids 
management plans 
Common name Scientific name 
African Daisy  Senecio pterophorus 
Blackberry  Rubus spp. 
Bridal Creeper  Asparagus asparagoides 
Broad-leaved Cotton-bush  Gomphocarpus cancellatus 
Gorse  Ulex europaeus 
Horehound  Marrubium vulgare 
Olive  Olea europaea 
Perennial Veldt Grass  Ehrharta calycina 
Pussy Tail Grass  Pentameris pallida 
Rose  Rosa canina and R. rubiginosa 
South African Orchid  Disa bracteata 






Table 3 Feral animals commonly targeted for control under Eastern Mt Lofty Ranges 
BushBids management plans 
Common name Scientific name 
Brown Hare  Lepus capensis 
Cat  Felis catus 
Deer  e.g. Dama dama, Cervus elaphus, 
European Rabbit  Oryctolagus cuniculus 
Goat  Capra hircus 
Red Fox  Vulpes vulpes 
 
Study system 
Location and landuse 
The five projects of the BushBids program were located in South Australia, in the Mt Lofty 
Ranges, Murray-Darling Basin and South East agricultural regions and covered a large 
geographic area of more than 30,000 km2. The dominant land use in the BushBids project 
areas was agriculture at 76-96% of land area, with residential land at 1-21% of land area. 
Agricultural activities in the region were diverse and included livestock grazing and intensive 
livestock production, broad-acre cropping (cereals, oilseed and pulses), hay and silage 
production, viticulture and horticulture (ABS, 2016). Native vegetation in these project areas 
has been extensively cleared with as little as 8% of the original extent remaining in the 
Eastern Mt Lofty Ranges BushBids project area (see Figure 2) (DEWNR, 2011). Of the 
remaining native vegetation cover, 3-59% was protected in public protected areas (e.g. 
National Parks) (DEWNR, 2015) and 7-38% was protected in private protected areas 
(covenants) (DEWNR, 2017). 
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Figure 2 BushBids project locations. Eastern Mt Lofty Ranges (EMLR), Woodland (WLND), 
Riverbend (RBND), Southern Mallee (SMLE) and South Eastern (SEAST) in South Australia, 
Australia. 
Climate 
According to Bureau of Meteorology data (BOM, 2014), the program area has a temperate 
to semi-arid climate with warm to hot summers and cold winters. Winters are generally wet 
and summer rainfall is usually low. Average annual rainfall ranges from approximately 880 
mm in the wettest part of the Eastern Mt Lofty Ranges (EMLR) to approximately 210 mm in 
the arid plains at the north of the Woodland and Riverbend BushBids project areas. 






The program area’s native vegetation was diverse, primarily including eucalypt dominated 
forests, woodlands, and mallee, as well as grasslands, wetlands, and chenopod shrublands 
(Department of Environment Water and Natural Resources, 2011). These regions also 
support threatened ecological communities including the critically endangered Iron-grass 
Natural Temperate Grassland of South Australia and Peppermint Box (Eucalyptus odorata) 
Grassy Woodland of South Australia (Australian Government, 2007), the endangered Buloke 
Woodlands of the Riverina and Murray-Darling Depression Bioregions (Endangered Species 
Scientific Subcommittee, 2000), the endangered Grey Box (Eucalyptus microcarpa) Grassy 
Woodlands and Derived Native Grasslands of South-eastern Australia (Australian 
Government, 2010) and the critically endangered Seasonal Herbaceous Wetlands 
(Freshwater) of the Temperate Lowland Plains (Australian Government, 2012). Images of 









Figure 3 Vegetation at study sites (Study (ii)). (a) Mallee Box Eucalyptus porosa woodland 
reference site, (b) South Australian Blue Gum E. leucoxylon woodland reference site, (c) 
South Australian Blue Gum E. leucoxylon and Drooping Sheoak Allocasuarina verticillata 
woodland impact site, (d) Pink Gum E. fasciculosa woodland impact site, (e) Red Gum E. 
camaldulensis and Manna Gum E. viminalis ssp. cygnetensis woodland control site, and (f) 
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A B S T R A C T
Voluntary incentive programs are widely used to generate conservation actions on private land. Although there
is a growing body of research about factors that influence landholder participation in incentive programs, studies
generally conceptualise landholders in agricultural landscapes as owner-occupier, farming individuals or fa-
milies. Few studies have considered participation by absentee landholders and fewer still have recognised group
landholders (e.g. non-government organisations or community groups) as potential incentive program partici-
pants. We examined participation in a conservation stewardship tender (reverse auction) in South Australia to
identify the diversity within participants, and particularly to evaluate the extent of participation by absentee
landholders and groups. A diverse set of landholders participated, where nearly a quarter of participants were
absentee landholders, and a small component were groups. Although small in number, groups were shown to be
important because they were likely to offer larger land areas in the stewardship tender. With very little known
about how absentee and group landholders may differ from their counterparts, further research is recommended
to inform incentive program design. We recommend that incentive programs consider landholder diversity in
order to achieve effective conservation in agricultural landscapes.
1. Introduction
At the global scale, publicly governed protected areas are not suf-
ficient to meet environmental targets on their own (UNEP-WCMC and
IUCN, 2016), leaving a significant contribution required from private
landholders (Figgis, 2004; Knight, 1999; Norton, 2000). Consequently,
private landholders have an important role to play in biodiversity
conservation and the sustainable provision of other ecosystem services.
The public good quality of biodiversity conservation and the im-
plementation and opportunity costs of changing management mean
that there are often cost barriers to optimal production of conservation
benefits on private land (Kinzig et al., 2011). Offering payments to
private landholders for environmental services through voluntary in-
centive programs is one approach widely employed to generate con-
servation action on private land (Doremus, 2003; Kamal et al., 2015).
However the drivers of participation can be complex and in many cases
remain insufficiently known (Lastra-Bravo et al., 2015; Sorice and
Donlan, 2015).
When participation in incentive programs is voluntary, the en-
vironmental outcomes of the program rely on appropriate levels of
participation (Mettepenningen et al., 2013; Rolfe et al., 2017; Selinske
et al., 2015; Zanella et al., 2014). Positive environmental outcomes are
dependent on sufficient participation from landholders responsible for
the assets of interest. However, high participation is not always desir-
able. In programs with a finite budget where participants compete for
funds, interest in participation may extend far beyond the available
budget, resulting in avoidable transaction costs and inefficiencies for
the program and participants (Whitten et al., 2013). Knowledge of the
target audience, and the factors that influence their participation, is
therefore required to inform the design of effective incentive programs
(Mettepenningen et al., 2013; Morrison et al., 2012; Rolfe et al., 2017;
Whitten et al., 2013).
While the level of incentives offered is a key factor, there are many
other factors that influence participation in incentive programs. These
include characteristics of the potential participants themselves, their
landholdings, their attitudes and behaviour and the social context
(Lastra-Bravo et al., 2015; Morrison et al., 2012). Research in this area
commonly examines factors such as participant age, education level and
experience (e.g. Comerford, 2014; Pavlis et al., 2016) and dependence
on the land or associated resources (e.g. Lindhjem and Mitani, 2012;
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Petrzelka et al., 2012). Social factors such as trust, connectedness and
access to information (e.g. Moon, 2013; Morrison et al., 2012; Zanella
et al., 2014) and attitudes and behaviour including personal satisfaction
from participation, agreement with the incentive program goals, busi-
ness orientation and information seeking behaviour (e.g. Comerford,
2014; Morrison et al., 2012; Pavlis et al., 2016; Reimer and Prokopy,
2014) are also frequently addressed. However, as Burton (2014) high-
lights, findings about the presence and direction of relationships be-
tween these factors and participation can be inconsistent or contra-
dictory because the cause of the relationships often remain poorly
understood. Another limitation of this area of research is that studies of
environmental behaviour in agricultural landscapes almost always
conceptualise landholders as owner-occupier farming individuals or
families, in empirical studies and reviews (e.g. Burton, 2014;
Defrancesco et al., 2008; Hill et al., 2011; Perkins et al., 2013) and in
economic choice experiments (e.g. Boxall et al., 2017; Wichmann et al.,
2016). Exceptions to this prevailing view are a small number of studies
that have considered absentee landholders (e.g.Lindhjem and Mitani,
2012; Petrzelka and Armstrong, 2015; Petrzelka et al., 2013, 2012;
Ulrich-Schad et al., 2016).
In many places, rural land ownership is becoming increasingly di-
verse, with growing numbers of non-primary producer “amenity mi-
grants” (Cooke and Lane, 2015; Gosnell and Abrams, 2011) and ab-
sentee landholders (Mendham and Curtis, 2010; Petrzelka et al., 2013).
While the influence of land use on participation has been addressed by
many studies, only a small number of these have examined participa-
tion by absentee landholders. Studies of absentee landholder partici-
pation indicate that absentee landholders may be less concerned with
financial incentives for land management change (Farmer et al., 2015),
or accept lower incentives compared with resident owners (Lindhjem
and Mitani, 2012), and that access to information can be a key barrier
to participation (Petrzelka et al., 2012; Ulrich-Schad et al., 2016). An-
other contribution to the diversity of participants in conservation on
private land is made by group landholders such as community groups,
not-for-profit conservation organisations, and corporations (Fitzsimons,
2015; Gosnell and Travis, 2005; Selinske et al., 2015). To our knowl-
edge, information about group landholders as participants in con-
servation incentive programs has not been directly examined in the
literature.
This study aims to investigate the diversity in incentive program
participants, and in particular, to identify the role of absentee land-
holders and groups. We took a novel approach to the characterisation of
participants in a conservation stewardship program in South Australia
where incentives were allocated by tender (a reverse, single-sealed-bid
auction). We examined a range of participant characteristics including
their involvement in primary production, whether they are resident or
absentee and whether they participated as an individual/family or
group. Statistical models were used to test the relationships between
these factors and the size of the area offered in the tender. Results are
discussed in the context of incentive program design to promote con-
servation on private land.
2. Materials and methods
To investigate the question of which landholders participate in
conservation incentive programs we used the BushBids conservation
stewardship program as a case study. This program had 163 unique
participants and spanned a large geographic area (more than
30,000 km2) in the agricultural regions to the east of Adelaide, South
Australia. Average annual rainfall in the program area ranged from
approximately 880mm in the wettest part of the Mt Lofty Ranges to
approximately 210mm in the arid plains to the north of the River
Murray (BOM, 2014). Agricultural activities in the program area in-
cluded broad-acre cropping (cereals, pulses, oilseed), hay and silage
production, horticulture, viticulture, livestock grazing, and intensive
livestock production (ABS, 2016). The program area’s native vegetation
was diverse, primarily including eucalypt dominated forests, wood-
lands, and mallee, as well as grasslands, wetlands, and chenopod
shrublands (DEWNR, 2011).
2.1. BushBids conservation stewardship program
The work presented here is based on the BushBids program
(Australian Government, 2006). The aim of this program was to support
private landholders to maintain or restore the ecological function of
remnant native vegetation on their property. Briefly, private land-
holders were invited to tender (bid) for 5 or 10 year contracts to
manage and restore native vegetation. Over the period from 2006 to
2013, there were five BushBids projects with a total of eight tender
rounds (Table 1). The projects were advertised through a variety of
channels: local newspapers and newsletters; local radio and television;
agricultural field days; and government and non-government organi-
sation natural resources management networks. Participation was vo-
luntary and landholders were not obliged to bid in the tender, or accept
the contract if their bid was successful. After the landholder made an
expression of interest, an on-site assessment of the location, size and
condition of the native vegetation on their property was made by
BushBids, and a native vegetation management plan was prepared for
the landholder (O’Connor et al., 2014). Management plans mapped the
area of native vegetation offered in the project and outlined manage-
ment actions designed to maintain or improve the condition or ecolo-
gical function of the native vegetation. Management of grazing pressure
from stock and retaining fallen timber were mandatory, and always
included in the management plan, while weed control and feral animal
control were usually included and revegetation was occasionally in-
cluded.
At a broad level, management plans were consistent throughout all
five BushBids projects, however, the extent to which management ac-
tions differed from existing practices depended on participant circum-
stances. Management of stock grazing pressure under a BushBids
management plan required complete stock exclusion from the site in
most cases, but a conservative stock grazing regime was allowed in
grassy ecosystems where it was used as a management tool to maintain
or restore ecological function. For some participants this represented a
change in management with associated forgone resources, while for
participants who had already excluded stock or were already using
conservative grazing practices in grassy ecosystems, there was no or
minimal change required. Weed species and feral animal species tar-
geted for control also differed between project locations and to a lesser
extent, within project locations according to variation in climate and
Table 1
BushBids conservation stewardship tenders.
Project name Tender Rounds Contract start Contract length (years) No. unique participants
Eastern Mt Lofty Ranges (EMLR) 2 2006–07 5 or 10 55
Woodland (WLND) 2 2010-11 5 32
Riverbend (RBND) 1 2013 5 23
Southern Mallee (SMLE) 1 2013 5 9
South Eastern (SEAST) 2 2013 5 44
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other environmental conditions. The management actions were in-
tended to maintain or restore ecological function in remnant vegetation
in order to address past and continuing declines identified by Duncan
and Dorrough (2009) and Perring et al. (2015) for example. However,
the ecological outcomes of these restoration actions have not yet been
documented in research literature.
2.2. BushBids project locations
The five BushBids projects were located in the Mt Lofty Ranges,
Murray-Darling Basin and South East regions of South Australia, where
much of the original native vegetation has been cleared to provide land
for agriculture (Fig. 1). Native vegetation cover in the project locations
ranged from 8% in the Eastern Mt Lofty Ranges (EMLR) project to 61%
in the Woodland (WLND) and River Bend (RBND) projects (Table 2). In
addition to having the smallest proportion of remaining native vege-
tation, the EMLR project location had one of the smallest proportions of
native vegetation protected in public protected areas (4%) and the
highest proportion of residential land (21%). The WLND project loca-
tion had the next largest proportion of residential land (7%) and al-
though it had a large proportion of remnant vegetation, only 7% was
protected by covenants (similar to conservation easements) on private
land and only 3% was in public protected areas. The RBND location,
also with a large proportion of remnant native vegetation, had similar
levels of protected vegetation to the WLND location, but a smaller
proportion of residential land (3%) and a larger proportion of land used
for primary production (87%). The Southern Mallee (SMLE) project
location had the largest proportion of land used for primary production
(96%) and small proportions of remnant native vegetation (9%) and
residential land (1%). Like the SMLE location, the South Eastern
(SEAST) project location had a very small proportion of residential
land, however this location had a moderate proportion of remnant
native vegetation (22%), much of which was protected by covenants
(16%) and in public protected areas (59%).
2.3. Data
Data about participants and their native vegetation were collected
by the BushBids program through the expression of interest and site
assessment processes. A subset of these data was made available for this
study, including the size of the area offered for management at the draft
management plan stage (referred to here as management plan size), the
presence of proposed and existing covenants (similar to conservation
easements), gender of the primary contact person/people, town of
postal address and nearest town to the property, entity type, and in-
formation about the participant’s involvement in primary production.
This information was used to generate a set of eight categorical vari-
ables and one numerical variable characterising participants. The ca-
tegorical variables were selected to provide information about the di-
versity of participants. Entity type, absentee status and primary
production status were selected to evaluate the extent to which parti-
cipants diverged from owner occupier, farming individuals or families.
Gender of primary contact was included firstly to identify the extent of
gender diversity in participants and secondly to evaluate how the other
variables related to this fundamental demographic diversity measure.
Although it’s been shown that in developed economies women are more
likely than men to engage in pro environmental behaviour (Hunter
et al., 2004; Raymond and Brown, 2011), in this study, this trend is
likely to be hidden by the gender imbalance in management and
ownership of rural land noted by Raymond and Brown (2011). Three
covenant (conservation easement) status variables were included to
allow evaluation of how permanent covenants may interact with par-
ticipation in the stewardship tender. Finally, the project location vari-
able was included to allow evaluation of how the other participant
characteristics varied with location.
Entity type includes two categories: individual/family and group.
The individual/family category includes individuals or family groups
where all members were connected by a familial relationship. All re-
maining participants shared a common characteristic in that they were
groups where not all group members shared a familial relationship. This
group category comprises a broad spectrum of participants including
community groups, non-government organisations and corporations
(other than family business structures), and also extends to include
local government and informal groups where two or more group
members were co-owners or co-managers with no familial relationship.
The absentee or resident variable was generated using information
about the nearest town to the land offered for management and the
town of the participant’s postal address. Where the town nearest the
land offered for management and the town of the postal address of the
participant matched or were proximate, the participant was classified
as resident. If the town nearest to the land offered for management and
the town of the participant’s postal address were spatially distant then
the participant was classified as absentee. For example, these cases
Fig. 1. BushBids project locations Eastern Mt Lofty Ranges (EMLR), Woodland (WLND),
Riverbend (RBND), Southern Mallee (SMLE) and South Eastern (SEAST) in South
Australia, Australia.
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included participants who resided in Adelaide (or a major regional
centre) but offered management services on a rural property. Some of
the absentee participants resided on rural properties but offered man-
agement services on rural property in a different location. Where a
participant offered land for management from two or more properties
and met the criteria for being resident at one property the participant
was classified as resident.
The gender of the primary contact was derived from the contact
names participants gave when expressing interest in BushBids, and for
the site assessment and development of the management plan. A
number of participants provided contact names for more than one
person and where male and female contact names were given this was
classified as “both” rather than male or female.
The primary production status was assessed using a range of in-
formation collected by BushBids. This information included direct ob-
servations made by BushBids personnel, satellite imagery of the areas
adjacent to the native vegetation and participant reported land use. If
there was any primary production activity undertaken by the partici-
pant or by another party on the participant’s property, then the parti-
cipant was classified as a primary producer. Primary production ac-
tivity included livestock, cropping, orchards and vineyards. Keeping
horses for recreation and small scale, domestic gardening or poultry
keeping were not classified as primary production activity. A small
number of participants (six) could not be classified using the available
information.
The project location was also included as a categorical variable. As
some participants were involved in more than one BushBids project,
participants were classified according to the BushBids project where
their bid was successful, or if they did not make a successful bid, they
were allocated to the first BushBids project they participated in.
The covenant variables categorise participants according to the
presence or absence of existing and proposed covenants in their
BushBids management plan. The covenants referred to in this study are
similar to conservation easements in the USA (e.g. Fishburn et al.,
2009), in that they are binding agreements established to conserve
environmental values on private land. This study exclusively deals with
Native Vegetation Heritage Agreements, a form of covenant in South
Australia (Adams and Moon, 2013). Native Vegetation Heritage
Agreements establish legally prescribed, usually permanent land use
restrictions on a piece of land, with the agreement registered on the
land title (Native Vegetation Act, 1991). Land use restrictions under
Native Vegetation Heritage Agreements include restrictions on clear-
ance or removal of native flora and fauna, introduction of non-native
organisms and fertiliser, and removal or disturbance of soil and rock
(Native Vegetation Council, 2017). They are generally consistent
regardless of location and ecosystem type, with some relatively rare
exceptions for stock grazing in grassy ecosystems (where it is used as a
tool for conservation) and in the Monarto area where a specific type of
Heritage Agreement was historically established with lower level re-
strictions. These variations in restrictions are unlikely to affect many of
the participants and therefore have not been addressed in the analysis.
The three covenant variables used in this study; existing covenant,
proposed covenant and existing and/or proposed covenant were cre-
ated from information about the presence of existing and proposed
Native Vegetation Heritage Agreements within the management plans
negotiated with participants. Where a Native Vegetation Heritage
Agreement application had been submitted prior to participation in
BushBids but the agreement had not yet been established, this was
treated as an existing covenant.
The numerical variable management plan size was the total size of
the area offered by the landholder for BushBids at the draft manage-
ment plan stage, regardless of whether or not the landholder submitted
a bid. Where the landholder participated in multiple BushBids projects
and/or tender rounds, the total area offered by that landholder across
all projects and rounds was used.
2.4. Data analysis
The Pearson’s Chi-square test of independence with Yates’
Continuity Correction was used to test whether absentee landholders
and covenants were associated with primary production status.
Observations from the unclassified category for primary production
status were excluded from this analysis due to the small number of
observations in this category. All expected frequencies were greater
than five.
Ward’s hierarchical cluster analysis was undertaken to identify
groups within the participants. This method provided a relatively high
cophenetic correlation coefficient (0.63) compared with other hier-
archical cluster analysis methods and provided an interpretable solu-
tion with four groups, each containing a sufficient number of ob-
servations. A dissimilarity matrix was created for the cluster analysis
using Gower’s metric due to this metric’s suitability for categorical
variables. The dissimilarity matrix used a subset of the data: entity,
gender of primary contact, primary production status, resident/ab-
sentee status and status for new and existing covenants separately.
Observations in the “unclassified” category for primary production
status were excluded due to the small number of observations in this
category.
Linear modelling was used to test the relationship between man-
agement plan size and the predictor variables entity type, primary
Table 2
BushBids project location size, native vegetation cover and land use.
Project Total area km2 Native vegetation km2
(%)a,f
Covenant km2 (%)b,d Public protected areas km2
(%)b,e
Land use (%)c,g
Primary production Reserve/ vacant/
recreation
Residential
EMLR 2 758 233 (8%) 88 (38%) 9 (4%) 76% 2% 21%
WLND 5 878 3 581 (61%) 245 (7%) 120 (3%) 81% 10% 7%
RBND 5 787 3 509 (61%) 735 (21%) 105 (3%) 87% 10% 3%
SMLE 6 964 618 (9%) 162 (26%) 44 (7%) 96% 1% 1%
SEAST 27 899 6 092 (22%) 961 (16%) 3 600 (59%) 84% 14% 1%
NB spatial statistics calculated using Geocentric Datum of Australia 1994 and Albers Equal Area projection in ArcGIS 10.4.1.
a Per cent of total area.
b Per cent of native vegetation.
c Per cent of total mapped land use (‘Primary production’ includes agriculture, horticulture, livestock grazing and forestry; ‘Reserve/vacant/recreation’ includes golf, reserve, re-
creation and vacant; and ‘Residential’ includes residential, rural residential, non-private residential and vacant residential).
d Spatial data source (DEWNR, 2017).
e Spatial data source (DEWNR, 2015).
f Spatial data source (DEWNR, 2011).
g Spatial data source (DPTI, 2016).
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production status, absentee status, covenant status and gender of pri-
mary contact. The management plan size variable was natural log
transformed to meet assumptions of normality, and observations with
“unclassified” primary production status were removed from the da-
taset. A linear model of the main effects was fitted and tested with
ANOVA both by adding terms to the model and dropping terms from
the model. These two approaches yielded slightly different results,
however, we selected the more conservative results from the additive
approach for presentation here.
Generalized linear modelling with Bayesian model averaging (BMA)
(Hoeting et al., 1999) was then used to confirm the results from the
linear model and examine the relationship of management plan size to
predictor variables within each of the four largest projects. BMA cal-
culates an average of multiple model predictions, weighted by the
posterior model probabilities. When a predictor variable had a 0.75 or
greater probability of inclusion in the model, it was considered to be an
important predictor (Thomson et al., 2007; Viallefont et al., 2001).
All statistical analyses were performed using R 3.2.4. The Gower’s
dissimilarity matrix was created using the package cluster 2.0.5
(Maechler et al., 2016), while the package BMA 3.18.6 (Raftery et al.,
2015) was used for Bayesian model averaging.
3. Results
3.1. Participants
Of the 163 participants, a large majority were individuals or fa-
milies (92%) with the remainder consisting of groups (8%). The gender
of the primary contact person was most frequently male (60%), al-
though a considerable proportion of primary contacts were female
(20%) or included at least one person of each gender (20%).
A little over half the participants were involved in some kind of
primary production (55%), while approximately 41% were not in-
volved in primary production and a small number (4%) could not be
classified (Fig. 2(a–d)). At the time of expressing interest in the pro-
gram, most participants were resident on their property (77%),
however, a considerable proportion were not (23%) (Fig. 2(a)). Thirty
four per cent of participants had an existing covenant (similar to a
conservation easement) over part or all of the land offered in BushBids
(Fig. 2(c)) and 25% of participants indicated they would like to apply
for a covenant (Fig. 2(d)). Almost half of the participants (44%) did not
have a covenant over the land offered in the project and were not
proposing to apply for one as part of their offered management services
(Fig. 2(b)).
The Chi-squared independence test revealed that resident/absentee
status was dependent on primary production status (Chi-square in-
dependence test X2= 23.4, df= 1, P < 0.0001) with a larger pro-
portion of absentee landholders within those not involved in primary
production, compared with those landholders who were involved in
primary production (Fig. 2(a)). However, no significant relationship
was found between covenants and primary production status (X2= 1.6,
df= 1, P=0.2) (Fig. 2(b)).
Four groups of participants were identified through hierarchical
cluster analysis and are here after referred to as clusters (Fig. 3(a–f)).
Cluster 1 was the largest and included 45% of all participants. It mainly
comprised participants who were classed as individuals or families
(94% of Cluster 1) (Fig. 3(a)), resident (85% of Cluster 1) (Fig. 3(b)),
and involved in primary production (65% of Cluster 1) (Fig. 3(c)).
Nearly all participants in this cluster did not have an existing covenant
(97% of Cluster 1) (Fig. 3(d)) and did not have a proposed covenant
(99% of Cluster 1) (Fig. 3(f)). The next largest cluster, Cluster 2, in-
cluded 23% of total participants and was comprised entirely of in-
dividuals or families (Fig. 3(a)) with a proposed covenant (Fig. 3(f)).
This cluster had relatively similar proportions of primary producers
(56% of Cluster 2) and non-primary producers (44% of Cluster 2)
(Fig. 3(c)), a relatively large proportion of absentee landholders (25%
of Cluster 2) (Fig. 3(b)) and the largest proportion of female primary
contacts (42% of Cluster 2) (Fig. 3(e)) compared with the other clusters.
Cluster 3 included 17% of all participants and was comprised ex-
clusively of participants who were not involved in primary production
(Fig. 3(c)) and also had a large component of absentee landholders
(65% of Cluster 3) (Fig. 3(b)), groups (31% of Cluster 3) (Fig. 3(a)) and
Fig. 2. Per cent of participants involved in primary production (un-
classified indicated by UC) and (a) absentee or resident, (b) with an
existing covenant and/or proposed covenant, (c) with an existing
covenant, (d) with a proposed covenant. NB width of bar indicates
proportion or per cent of participants in a given category, dark grey
indicates ‘yes’ and light grey indicates ‘no’ for y-axis variables.
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participants with an existing covenant (92% of Cluster 3) (Fig. 3(d)).
Finally, Cluster 4 was the smallest cluster and included 15% of all
participants. Similar to cluster 1, cluster 4 was comprised entirely of
participants who were resident (Fig. 3(b)), involved in primary pro-
duction (Fig. 3(c)) and not proposing a new covenant (Fig. 3(f)).
However unlike cluster 1, all members of the cluster 4 had an existing
covenant (Fig. 3(d)).
3.1.1. Absentee landholders
A majority of participating absentee landholders were non-primary
producers (76% of 38 absentee participants) compared with 21% who
were primary producers (Fig. 2(a)). Likewise, more absentee partici-
pants were individuals/families (82% of absentee participants) than
were groups (18% of absentee participants). The WLND project location
had the highest percentage of absentee participants (34% of partici-
pants in that project) followed by the EMLR project where 29% of
participants were absentee and the RBND project where 26% of parti-
cipants were absentee (Fig. 4(a)). The SMLE and SEAST projects both
had lower rates of absentee participants with 11% and 9% respectively.
3.1.2. Groups
Following a similar pattern as the absentee participants, most
participating groups were non-primary producers (77% of 13 partici-
pating groups), with the remaining 23% being classified as primary
producers. There was a roughly even division between absentee (seven)
and resident (six) participants within those classified as groups. Project
locations with the highest proportions of participating groups were the
RBND project where 13% of participants were groups, and both the
EMLR and WLND projects where 9% of participants were groups
(Fig. 4(b)). The SMLE project had no participating groups, while 5% of
participants in the SEAST project were groups.
3.2. Management plan size
The size of the area offered by participants in the tenders (referred
to here as management plan size) differed by four orders of magnitude
ranging from 0.5 ha to 4 792.6 ha, with a median of 45.7 ha and in-
terquartile range of 19.0 ha to 179.6 ha. Linear modelling showed a
significant relationship between management plan size and both project
location and entity type (see Table 3 and Supplementary Fig. S1). Other
participant characteristics (primary production status, covenant status,
gender of primary contact and resident/absentee status) were not sig-
nificantly related to management plan size.
Generalised linear modelling with Bayesian model averaging
Fig. 3. Characteristics of participant clusters identified with cluster
analysis. (a) per cent of entity type (G=group, I= individual/family)
within clusters, (b) per cent of absentee and resident landholders
within clusters, (c) per cent of primary producers and non-primary
producers within clusters, (d) per cent of participants with existing
covenants, (e) per cent of primary contact gender (B= both genders,
F= female, M=male), and (f) per cent of participants with proposed
covenants. NB width of bar indicates proportion or per cent of parti-
cipants in a given cluster.
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confirmed the relationship between management plan size and project
location and entity type with these factors identified as the strongest
predictors of management plan size, and the only predictors with
greater than 75% chance of inclusion in the model for all project lo-
cations combined (Table 4). Entities classified as individuals or families
were likely to have smaller management plans (coefficient of −1.14)
than entities classified as groups. Compared with EMLR, participants in
all other project locations were likely to have larger management plans
(coefficients ranging from 0.97 to 2.00). The SEAST project location
was the only individual location where predictors with a greater than
75% chance of inclusion were identified (Table 4). These predictors
were entity type, gender of primary contact, primary production status
and covenant status. Again, participants classified as individuals or
families were likely to have smaller management plans than group
participants. In the SEAST location, participants with female-only pri-
mary contacts were likely to have smaller management plans than
participants with primary contacts that included both genders. Non-
primary producers were likely to have smaller management plans than
primary producers and participants with neither existing nor proposed
covenants were likely to have smaller management plans than those
with covenants or proposed covenants.
4. Discussion
In this study we characterised participants in a conservation stew-
ardship tender (reverse auction) and examined how these character-
istics related to the size of the area offered in the tender. The range of
landholders interested in participating was diverse, including a con-
siderable proportion of absentee landholders, a small but important
constituent of groups and relatively equal proportions of primary pro-
ducers and non-primary producers. Project location was the best pre-
dictor of the size of the area offered in the tender followed by entity
type, with groups likely to offer larger areas compared with individuals
and families. The diversity of landholders participating in the tender is
consistent with the increasing diversity within agricultural landscapes
highlighted by Mendham and Curtis (2010). Both absentee landholders
and groups were found to be important participants, absentee land-
holders because they made up a considerable proportion of total par-
ticipants and groups because of the larger areas they offered in the
tender. Programs seeking to incentivise conservation actions on private
land must understand these ownership structures, particularly where
they result in participant behavioural differences compared with tra-
ditional, production oriented, family ownership models.
4.1. Absentee landholders
Absentee landholders made up nearly a quarter of all participants
and came from all project locations. This large component of absentee
landholders confirms their relevance within the community of private
land managers in agricultural landscapes and aligns with studies
showing increasing absentee ownership in various parts of the world
(Petrzelka et al., 2013) including Australia (Klepeis et al., 2009;
Mendham and Curtis, 2010). Further, these results provide empirical
evidence of absentee landholders’ interest in participating in a con-
servation stewardship tender, which to our knowledge has not pre-
viously been documented. Project locations with the highest rates of
absentee landholder participation were the EMLR project location
where much of the area is within 50 km of Adelaide (the nearest city)
and the WLND and RBND project locations where the majority of the
area is within 150 km of Adelaide and there is a relatively large pro-
portion of native vegetation remaining in the landscape. Travel distance
from cities is likely to influence the rates of absentee land ownership, at
least for non-primary producing landholders, however other inter-
related factors may also play a role such as amenity values, land pro-
ductivity and value, and land use planning and policy. Although there is
a substantial body of research relating to amenity migrants (Gosnell and
Abrams, 2011), relatively little is known about absentee landholders.
More research is needed to better understand the patterns and drivers of
absentee ownership and how rates of absentee landholder participation
in incentive programs compare with rates of absentee land ownership in
agricultural landscapes.
Participating absentee landholders included both primary producers
and non-primary producers, with most classed as non-primary produ-
cers. Absentee primary producers may have included landholders who
own two or more spatially separated rural properties to take advantage
of resources available in different environments (e.g. seasonal grazing
for stock while crops are grown on the primary property), or land-
holders who reside in an urban area and manage the property remotely.
Fig. 4. Per cent of (a) absentee participants (Y=yes, N=no) and (b) participating
groups (G=group, I= individual/family) in project locations (unlabelled bars are SMLE
project location). NB width of bar indicates proportion or per cent of participants in each
project location.
Table 3
Relationship of participant characteristics to management plan size.
Factor Df F value Pr(> F) Coefficient ± SE
Project location 4 8.4672 0.0004e-02
WLND 1.2 ± 0.3
RBND 1.5 ± 0.4
SMLE 1.8 ± 0.5
SEAST 0.8 ± 0.3
Entity type 1 8.3245 0.0045
Individual/family −1.2 ± 0.4
Gender of primary contact 2 1.7511 0.1772
Primary production status 1 3.7677 0.0542
Resident or absentee 1 0.6255 0.4303
Covenant status 1 2.9944 0.0857
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Non-primary producer absentee participants are likely to have included
“weekenders” who reside in urban areas and periodically visit their
rural properties for recreation and/or other purposes, or groups who
jointly use and manage the land for a variety purposes (such as re-
creation, conservation and/or non-primary production businesses).
Recreation has been found to be a widespread purpose for land own-
ership among absentee landholders and intersection of multiple land
uses is also common (Petrzelka and Armstrong, 2015; Petrzelka et al.,
2009). To facilitate participation by absentee landholders, private land
conservation policy makers are advised to recognise that absenteeism
may coincide with a variety of often co-existing land use objectives.
Although they are a diverse group, absentee landholders may face
some particular challenges for land management and incentive program
participation that set them apart from resident landholders. Absentee
landholders may not access the same information sources as resident
landholders, therefore presenting a challenge for incentive program
recruitment. Time constraints may also be a major barrier for absentee
landholders, including at the time of recruitment to a program
(Mendham et al., 2012), having insufficient time available to imple-
ment management actions (Kendra and Hull, 2005; Klepeis et al., 2009)
or experiencing difficulties with the timing or frequency of visits re-
quired for management, such as implementing weed control at a critical
weed lifecycle stage. The cost of implementing management actions
may also be influenced by absentee status (Mendham et al., 2012). For
example, there may be additional costs associated with travel and
transport to the property and/or hired labour and equipment. However,
absentee landholders’ possible willingness to accept lower incentive
rates (Lindhjem and Mitani, 2012) may offset additional management
costs. Another management challenge potentially exacerbated by ab-
senteeism is impacts from unauthorised access to the property
(O’Connor, 2016) for activities such as off road vehicle use, camping,
hunting (Kendall et al., 2013) and timber theft (Petrzelka et al., 2013).
Many of these barriers or challenges faced by absentee landholders can
be addressed by incentive program design. For example, program re-
cruitment methods can be designed to reach absentee landholders
through the use of appropriate advertising messages (Morrison et al.,
2017), advertising channels, and timing of recruitment events
(Mendham and Curtis, 2010). Absentee participation is also likely to be
supported by programs that allow some flexibility in timing for en-
gagement and implementation of management actions. Further re-
search is needed to determine the extent to which issues affecting ab-
sentee landholders are addressed by incentive programs.
4.2. Groups
The number of group participants was relatively small, however the
group entity type was positively related to management plan size. This
highlights their importance as potential participants in incentive pro-
grams. Although groups have been acknowledged as managers in the
private land conservation literature (Fitzsimons, 2015; Selinske et al.,
2015) and in studies of landholders in agricultural landscapes (Gosnell
and Travis, 2005), to our knowledge, they have not previously been
considered in studies about participation in incentive programs. Parti-
cipants classed as groups in this study included a wide range of group
forms, from non-government organisations to local government, cor-
porations, community groups and small informal groups of individuals
who co-own and/or co-manage remnant native vegetation. We ac-
knowledge that this is a very broad spectrum and that motivations for
participation in incentive programs and objectives for land manage-
ment may vary considerably between groups, however, in this study,
the small number of participating groups did not allow further classi-
fication at a finer scale. Further research is needed to identify group
types along with their motivations and constraints for participation in
conservation incentive programs. Despite the wide variation in types of
groups, there may be some characteristics that group landholders share.
For example, groups may require longer time periods for decision
making, a need that could be accommodated in incentive program
design. As current information relating to groups and their participation
in incentive programs is very scarce, it is an important area for future
research to inform policy.
4.3. Covenants
Landholders with and without existing covenants (conservation
easements) participated in the conservation stewardship tender and
some were interested in applying for a new covenant. The largest
Table 4
Probability of a non-zero coefficient P(inc), coefficients, Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) and R2 for management plan size in all locations combined and in EMLR, SEAST, WLND and
RBND locations, determined with Bayesian model averaging.
Predictor/BIC/ R2/n All locations EMLR SEAST WLND RBND
P(inc) coeff ± SD P(inc) P(inc) coeff ± SD P(inc) P(inc)
Intercept 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
(Group entity, Both genders, Primary producer, EMLR location, Covenant)
Entity type 92.0 15.4 79.1 59.6 15.1
Individual/family −1.14 ± 0.52 −1.84 ± 1.26
Gender of primary contact 0.0 0.0 84.6 2.4 1.2
Female − 1.58 ± 0.89
Male − 0.10 ± 0.42
Resident or absentee 6.5 44.9 17.4 11.7 37.2
Primary production status 32.9 11.0 90.5 12.0 49.4
Non-primary producer −1.40 ± 0.71
Project location 100.0 NA NA NA NA
WLND 1.29 ± 0.32
RBND 1.48 ± 0.36
SMLR 2.00 ± 0.53
SEAST 0.97 ± 0.31
Covenant status 14.9 25.4 100.0 12.4 15.5
No covenant −1.76 ± 0.44
BIC −602.3 −151.9 −98.1 −76.3 −41.6
R2 0.22 0.06 0.56 0.12 0.19
n 157 53 42 32 21
Pr(inc) probability of inclusion.
BIC Bayesian information criterion.
Coefficient and standard deviation shown only when Pr(inc)> 75%.
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cluster of participants identified with hierarchical cluster analysis was
characterised by participants who did not have an existing covenant
and did not express interest in applying for one. This highlights a large
constituency of participants who were not prepared to enter into an in-
perpetuity covenant but were still willing to offer management services
over a five or ten year period. Participants in this cluster were resident,
primary producing individuals or families. Given that previous research
indicates that participation is reduced when the program employs
compulsory covenanting (Comerford, 2013), this large sector of land-
holders may have been dissuaded from participation if the program had
made covenanting mandatory.
The next largest cluster was characterised by landholders seeking a
covenant and included both primary producers and non-primary pro-
ducers as well as absentee and resident landholders. Therefore, there
was a potential supply of covenants from both primary producers and
non-primary producers and absentee and resident landholders. The
final two clusters were characterised by participants who had an ex-
isting covenant and were not seeking an additional covenant. These
clusters show that even with an existing covenant there is a perceived
need for additional management cost recovery, that is, these land-
holders do not consider that a covenant on its own was sufficient to
meet their management objectives.
4.4. Management plan size
Location and entity type were the only reliable predictors of man-
agement plan size when all project locations were considered together.
This relationship between project location and management plan size is
probably driven by differences in agricultural productivity, rainfall and
proximity to the city of Adelaide and large rural centres, as well as
associated differences in average land parcel size, property size and
land value. Group entities were likely to include larger areas in their
management plans than entities classified as individuals/families. This
could be explained by the ability of groups to pool resources and
therefore purchase and manage larger areas of land. It might also be a
consequence of historic development patterns leaving some large areas
of uncleared land with relatively low production value where buyers do
not expect to recover their investment through production. With groups
being more likely to offer larger areas of land in the incentive program,
they may be seen as an important sector of participants to recruit.
However, maximising the area of land offered by each participant or the
total area offered in the incentive program may not always be desirable.
For instance, an adequate number of participants is required to provide
competition in a tender making it potentially undesirable to have a
small number of participants offering large land areas, and there may
also be significant transaction costs for each entrant meaning increasing
participation beyond adequate levels is not justified by the total budget
for incentive payments (Whitten et al., 2013).
The SEAST project location was the only individual project with
reliable predictors of management plan size. Here, group entities, pri-
mary producers and sites with an existing covenant were associated
with larger management plan sizes, while having a female primary
contact was associated with smaller management plan size. The re-
lationship to primary production status may be due to the generally
larger properties held by primary producers compared with non-pri-
mary producers (Mendham and Curtis, 2010), while the relationship to
covenant status may be a consequence of previous government legis-
lation (e.g. Upper South East Dryland Salinity and Flood Management
Act, 2002) and associated policy having already established covenants
on many of the larger remnants in the project location.
5. Conclusion
This study challenges the notion that, in agricultural landscapes,
landholders interested in conservation incentive programs are typically
farming individuals or families. Using empirical evidence from a case
study conservation tender program we have shown that participating
landholders can be diverse in land use, residence distance from the
property and land ownership structure. They may or may not use their
property for primary production, they may be resident on the property
or absentee and they may own the land individually or jointly as part of
a group. Both absentee landholders and groups were important parti-
cipants in the conservation program, absentee landholders due to their
considerable numbers and groups because they were likely to offer
larger land areas in the tender.
Given the importance of absentee and group landholders revealed
by this study, and the extremely limited information currently available
regarding these landholder types, we recommend further research to
address the following knowledge gaps. Firstly, research is needed to
identify more specific group types within the broad category of group
landholders and to investigate their motivations and constraints for
participation. For absentee landholders, research is needed to further
explore the drivers and patterns of absentee land ownership and to
evaluate how rates of absentee landholder participation compare to
rates of absentee land ownership. Finally, research is also needed to
further examine the extent to which issues affecting absentee land-
holders, such as access to information, time constraints and un-
authorised property access, are addressed by incentive programs. This
knowledge will be valuable to inform future policy design for con-
servation incentive programs in agricultural landscapes.
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1.	 Evaluation	 of	 conservation	 incentive	 programme	outcomes	 is	 needed	 to	 direct	







set	 their	own	contract	price	 through	a	 reverse	auction.	 In	order	 to	maintain	or	
increase	species	and	structural	diversity	of	remnant	native	vegetation,	contracted	












generation,	 plant	 litter	 cover,	weed	cover	 and	 canopy	dieback.	However,	 these	
variables	did	show	changes	over	time	which	were	likely	due	to	weather,	particu-
larly	an	extended	period	of	drought	followed	by	unusually	high	rainfall.
5. Policy implications.	This	study	shows	that	revealed‐price	 incentive	contracts	can	
produce	biodiversity	improvement	compared	with	the	business‐as‐usual	scenario	
of	 native	 vegetation	 management	 on	 private	 land.	 The	 use	 of	 a	 Before‐After‐
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1  | INTRODUC TION
Biodiversity	 in	 agricultural	 landscapes	 is	 generally	 declining,	while	
also	being	increasingly	recognised	as	a	necessity	for	ecosystem	ser-
vice	 provision	 (Cardinale	 et	 al.,	 2012).	 Incentive	 programmes	 are	
a	 policy	 mechanism	 widely	 used	 to	 address	 biodiversity	 declines	
on	private	 land	 in	agricultural	 landscapes	 (Doremus,	2003;	Kamal,	
Grodzińska‐Jurczak,	 &	 Brown,	 2015)	 and	 significant	 funding	 has	
been	 invested	 in	 them	 (Batáry,	 Dicks,	 Kleijn,	 &	 Sutherland,	 2015;	
Rolfe,	Whitten,	&	Windle,	2017;	Wu	&	Yu,	2017).	However,	the	ef-




comes	 from	 large‐scale	 incentive	 programmes.	 Dealing	 with	 high	
variability	 amongst	 samples	 and/or	 interventions	 can	 be	 a	 major	
difficulty	 as	 can	 separating	 intervention	 effects	 from	 background	
variability	 driven	 by	 external	 factors	 like	 climate	 or	 weather.	 In	
theory	 these	 challenges	 can	 be	managed	 by	 adopting	 appropriate	
experimental	design.	Two	key	experimental	design	elements	to	en-
able	robust	programme	evaluation	were	recommended	by	Kleijn	and	
Sutherland	 (2003).	 These	 were;	 (a)	 establishment	 of	 an	 adequate	
baseline	prior	to	intervention	coupled	with	measurement	of	trends	
or	 change	over	 time,	 and	 (b)	 identification	 and	use	of	 appropriate	
controls.	However,	there	are	few	examples	in	subsequent	research	
where	these	recommendations	have	been	comprehensively	adopted.
Some	 studies	 have	 sought	 to	 compensate	 for	 the	 absence	 of	
baseline	data	and/or	measures	of	change	by	careful	selection	of	con-
trol	 sites	 to	 reduce	potential	bias	 (e.g.	Kleijn	et	 al.,	2006)	or	using	
space‐for‐time	substitution	designs	(e.g.	Lindenmayer,	Wood,	et	al.,	
2012;	 Michael,	 Wood,	 Crane,	 Montague‐Drake,	 &	 Lindenmayer,	
2014).	 However,	 while	 these	 approaches	 have	 provided	 valuable	
insights,	 they	 remain	open	 to	 the	 risk	of	bias	 in	 site	 selection	and	
cannot	 provide	 information	 on	 counterfactual	 trends,	 that	 is	 the	
background	trends	or	changes	without	intervention.	The	absence	of	
baseline	data	 in	many	cases	 is	 likely	due	to	the	widespread	 imple-
mentation	 of	 incentive	 programmes	without	 adequate	monitoring	
built	into	the	programme	design	from	the	outset,	either	because	of	
a	 failure	 to	 prioritise	 outcome	 evaluation	 or	 due	 to	 resource	 lim-















lection	 of	 control	 sites.	 The	 absence	 of	 control	 sites	 in	 baseline	
measurement	 has	 prevented	 separation	 of	 intervention	 effects	
from	background	trends	(e.g.	Duncan	&	Vesk,	2013).	Some	studies	


















evidence	 of	 incentive	 programme	 impact	 on	 biodiversity	 comes	
mainly	 from	 European	 Agri‐environmental	 schemes	 (AES),	 where	
interventions	 commonly	 include	 the	creation	of	 set	 aside	areas	or	










need	 for	 the	collection	of	baseline	data	prior	 to	contract	establishment	at	both	
impact	and	independently	managed	control	sites.









Riffell	 et	 al.,	 2008;	Vesk	et	 al.,	 2015).	 Intervention	 and	evaluation	
timeframes	 are	 also	 important	 because	 ecological	 outcomes	 may	
depend	on	temporally	variable	conditions	such	as	weather	(Vaughn	
&	Young,	2010).	To	date,	most	impact	evaluation	research	has	been	
located	 in	 central	 to	 northern	 Europe,	 with	 only	 a	 small	 number	
of	 studies	 in	 regions	with	 lower	 and/or	more	variable	 rainfall	 (e.g.	
Lindenmayer,	Wood,	et	al.,	2012;	Michael	et	al.,	2014;	Vesk	et	al.,	
2015).
Most	 research	 on	 incentive	 outcomes	 has	 focussed	 on	 fixed‐
price	 incentive	 schemes	 (e.g.	 European	 AES),	 however,	 there	 is	
growing	 interest	 in	 conservation	 auctions,	 where	 participants	 set	
their	 own	 price	 for	 management.	 Revealed‐price	 schemes	 differ	
from	fixed‐price	schemes	 in	some	aspects	that	may	 influence	pro-



























could	 be	 shown	 either	 as	 larger	 increases	 or	 smaller	 decreases	 in	
native	plant	diversity,	 regeneration	or	 structural	habitat	 indicators	







2  | MATERIAL S AND METHODS
2.1 | Study region
This	 study	 is	 located	 in	 the	 eastern	 Mt	 Lofty	 Ranges	 of	 South	
Australia,	 in	an	area	spanning	approximately	3,000	km2	 (Figure	1).	
Native	 vegetation	 in	 the	 region	 includes	 forests	 and	 woodlands	
(many	dominated	by	eucalypt	species)	as	well	as	shrublands,	grass-
lands	and	wetlands	(Department	of	Environment,	Water	and	Natural	
Resources,	 unpublished	 data).	 This	 study	 focusses	 on	 woodlands	
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2014).	 There	 was	 an	 extended	 period	 of	 below	 average	 rainfall	
from	 2006	 to	 early	 2010	 (Appendix	 S2),	 corresponding	 with	 the	
final	 years	 of	 the	 1997–2009	 ‘millennium	 drought’	 (CSIRO,	 2012),	
the	worst	recorded	drought	in	south	eastern	Australia.	The	drought	
was	broken	by	extremely	high	rainfall	events	in	2010	and	2011	both	
within	 the	study	region	 (see	Appendix	S2)	and	elsewhere	 in	south	
eastern	Australia	(CSIRO,	2012).
2.3 | Eastern Mt Lofty Ranges BushBids project

























2.4 | Study design and data
This	study	aimed	to	evaluate	the	impact	of	10‐year	contracts	with	
incentive	 payments	 set	 by	 the	 landholders.	 We	 used	 a	 modified	
BACI	design,	with	a	 total	of	33	sites	 in	 three	 treatment	 categories	
(impact,	control	and	reference).	There	were	12	impact	sites	on	pri-
vate	property	with	10‐year	BushBids	contracts,	10	control	sites	on	
private	 properties	without	 a	BushBids	 contract,	 and	11	 reference 
sites	on	public	land.
Contracted	management	at	 impact	 sites	 included	management	
of	grazing	pressure	from	stock	and	feral	animals,	retention	of	fallen	
logs,	weed	control	 and	management	 to	address	other	 threats.	For	
two	of	the	12	impact	sites,	stock	management	under	the	BushBids	
contract	 constituted	 a	material	 change	 compared	with	 prior	man-
agement.	See	Appendix	S3,	for	further	detail	of	management	actions	
and	Appendix	S4	 for	 a	 list	of	weed	and	 feral	 animal	 species	 com-





withdrew	before	bidding	or	 their	 bid	was	unsuccessful.	While	 the	
control	sites	were	not	managed	under	BushBids	contracts	during	the	





tinuous	management	 against	 known	 standards,	 (b)	 comprehensive	
management	of	 threats	 (i.e.	 restrictions	on	disturbance	along	with	

















gramme	was	 initiated.	 Some	 sites	were	 later	 excluded	when	 land-
holders	 could	 not	 be	 contacted	 at	 the	 time	 of	 reassessment.	 The	
plant	community	at	study	sites	was	either	woodland	with	a	sparse	
shrub	 layer	 and	 grassy	 understorey	 or	 woodland	 with	 a	 moder-
ately	 dense	 shrub	 layer	 and	 a	 grassy	 understorey.	Eucalyptus	 spe-
cies	generally	dominated	the	overstorey	except	for	two	sites	where	
Drooping	Sheoak	Allocasuarina verticillata	was	the	dominant	tree.
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measured	in	both	assessments.	The	measured	variables	are	detailed	





















and	 Chapman	 (2006)	 for	 the	 principal	 coordinates	 analysis.	 This	
taxonomic	dissimilarity	index	was	calculated	using	taxonomic	levels	
from	subspecies	or	variety	to	class.
To	 control	 for	 spatial	 autocorrelation	 and	 the	 potentially	 con-
founding	effects	of	variability	in	vegetation	composition	we	devel-
oped	two	variables	for	inclusion	as	covariates	in	statistical	models;	






Generalised	 Linear	Mixed	Models	 in	 the	 lme4	 package	 (Bates	
et	al.,	2016)	were	used	to	test	the	main	effects	treatment and time 











error	distribution	and	 identity	 link	 function,	because	 this	was	 the	
most	 appropriate	 option	 available.	 Tests	 were	 performed	 by	 se-
quentially	adding	terms	to	the	model	and	using	AIC	and	p‐values	to	
evaluate	which	terms	significantly	improved	the	model.	Covariates	
(location or vegetation group)	were	 included	where	 they	 improved	
the	model,	 except	 in	 two	 cases.	 Covariates	were	 not	 included	 in	
the	models	for	biological	crust	and	weed	cover	because	their	inclu-
sion	did	not	change	the	overall	conclusions	regarding	the	effects	of	
time or treatment × time,	but	did	 result	 in	model	estimates	of	 less	
than	zero	cover,	which	was	probably	due	to	the	use	of	the	Gaussian	
error	 distribution	 in	 these	 models.	 Model	 convergence	 warnings	
were	 received	 for	models	 of	 grazing	 pressure	 and	Acacia pycnan‐
tha	 regeneration,	 so	 these	 model	 estimates	 were	 cross	 checked	
using	all	available	optimisers.	Here	we	use	the	term	optimisers	to	





and	 therefore	 the	model	 for	A. pycnantha	 is	not	presented	 in	 the	
study	results.	GLMM	partial	residual	plots	were	created	using	the	
visreg	package	version	2.4‐1	(Breheny	&	Burchett,	2017).	Finally,	to	
provide	estimates	of	 the	proportion	of	 variance	explained	by	 the	





Three	 groups	 of	 compositionally	 similar	 sites	were	 identified	with	
ordination	 and	 hierarchical	 cluster	 analysis	 (Appendix	 S6a).	 These	
groups	approximately	follow	a	geographic	and	rainfall	gradient	from	
west	to	east.	Changes	in	composition	(taxonomic	dissimilarity)	were	










negatively	 correlated	with	weed	 cover.	Generally,	 sites	moved	 to-
ward	higher	 species	 richness	 and	away	 from	high	weed	cover	be-




the	 response	 variables.	Between	 the	 initial	 and	 final	 assessments,	
native	 plant	 species	 richness,	 regeneration,	 log	 abundance,	 plant	
litter	 cover,	 canopy	 dieback	 and	 grazing	 pressure	 all	 increased,	
whereas	weed	cover	decreased	(Figures	2‒4	and	Table	1).	Treatment 
35









with	 impact	 and	 reference	 sites)	 (Figures	 3e	 and	 4a	 and	 Table	 1).	
Native	 plant	 species	 richness	 showed	 a	 significant	 interaction	 be-
tween	 time and treatment	 (increased	 over	 time	 at	 impact	 and	 ref-
erence	sites	while	at	control	sites	 it	decreased)	when	tested	using	
Gaussian	error	distribution	(Figure	2a	and	Table	1).	Finally,	a	margin-




For	most	 response	 variables,	 64%	 or	more	 of	 variation	 in	 the	
data	was	explained	by	 the	models	 (including	 fixed	and	random	ef-
















results	 provide	 a	 unique	 contribution	 to	 the	 literature	 which	 has	
been	dominated	by	studies	of	fixed‐price	incentives	for	set	aside	or	











































































(f) Plant litter cover change
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than	 the	 initial	 assessment	 but	 this	 increase	was	 smaller	 than	 the	





tion	measures	support	 the	hypothesis	 that	10‐year,	 revealed‐price	
contracts	lead	to	vegetation	condition	improvement	compared	with	
the	 business‐as‐usual	 scenario	 on	 private	 land	 (control	 sites).	 The	
similarity	in	responses	of	impact	and	reference	sites	was	expected,	
as	reference	sites	were	managed	for	conservation	by	state	and	local	
government	 and	 community	 organisations.	Neither	 the	 ordination	
for	vegetation	composition	nor	a	manual	comparison	of	 initial	and	









intervention	were	 found.	This	 response	was	 seen	 in	 regeneration,	
plant	 litter	cover,	weed	cover	and	canopy	dieback	and	we	suggest	
it	 is	 linked	 to	 climate	 and	weather	 conditions,	 particularly	 rainfall,	
during	the	contract	period.	We	provide	further	discussion	of	changes	
in	response	to	time	in	Appendix	S8.

















































































(f) Log abundance change
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Poisson  460.54  Intercept:	3.41	±	0.11  
 Vegetation group 434.29 *** Group	2:	−0.31	±	0.11,	Group	3:	−0.62	±	0.10  
  Treatment 433.92  Impact:	0.11	±	0.12,	Reference:	−0.01	±	0.13  
  Time 430.08 * T1	−0.03	±	0.10  
  Treatment × time 430.88  ImpactT1:	0.18	±	0.13	ReferenceT1:	0.21	±	0.12 0.58,	0.76
Native	plant	spe-
cies	richness
Gaussian  464.00  Intercept:	32.18	±	2.79  
 Vegetation group 437.51 *** Group	2:	−8.72	±	2.94,	Group	3:	−15.41	±	2.67  
 Treatment 438.78  Impact:	1.47	±	2.88,	Reference:	−1.74	±	3.46  
  Time 433.34 ** T1:	−0.70	±	1.81  
  Treatment × time 430.96 * ImpactT1:	4.70	±	2.46	ReferenceT1:	6.06	±	2.51 0.63,	0.93
Regeneration Poisson  287.69  Intercept:	0.68	±	0.24  
  Treatment 284.20 * Impact:	0.45	±	0.31,	Reference:	0.56	±	0.31  
  Time 281.24 * T1	0.17	±	0.29  




Gaussian  326.43  Intercept:	14.00	±	1.01  
 Vegetation group 307.78 *** Group	2:	−2.32	±	1.03,	Group	3:	−4.29	±	0.94  
  Treatment 306.70 † Impact:	2.11	±	1.06,	Reference:1.66	±	1.26  
  Time 304.96 † T1:	1.30	±	0.80  
  Treatment × time 307.96  ImpactT1:	−0.30	±	1.08	ReferenceT1:	
−1.03	±	1.11
0.42,	0.64
Log	abundance Poisson  595.93  Intercept:	1.53	±	0.33  
  Treatment 597.81  Impact:	−0.69	±	0.46,	Reference:	0.02	±	0.46  
(Continues)
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Model	performance	was	generally	good,	with	models	explain-
ing	a	large	proportion	of	the	variance	for	most	response	variables.	




a	relatively	 large	proportion	of	 the	variance	 in	many	cases,	which	
highlights	 the	 need	 to	 account	 for	 this	 source	 of	 variation	 in	 fu-
ture	 studies.	 When	 detected,	 the	 intervention	 effect	 therefore	
accounted	 for	 a	 relatively	 small	 amount	 of	 the	 overall	 variance,	
highlighting	the	challenges	of	demonstrating	restoration	outcomes	
in	a	real	incentive	programme	with	heterogeneous	sites	in	an	envi-
































  Time 445.01 *** T1	0.66	±	0.14  
  Treatment × time 439.92 * ImpactT1:	0.60	±	0.22,	ReferenceT1:	0.48	±	0.20 0.27,	0.93
Canopy	dieback Gaussian  522.92  Intercept:	30.76	±	6.42  
  Treatment 520.84 * Impact:	−2.09	±	9.08,	Reference:	12.61	±	8.65  
  Time 506.79 *** T1:	13.84	±	6.67  
  Treatment × time 510.47  ImpactT1:	2.32	±	9.44	ReferenceT1:	4.82	±	9.00 0.42,	0.97
Plant	litter	cover Gaussian  583.22  Intercept:	40.99	±	5.65  
  Location 576.19 ** Group	2:	−18.00	±	6.03,	Group	3:	−11.93	±	6.12  
  Treatment 577.89  Impact:	−8.68	±	7.45,	Reference:	−8.56	±	7.60  
  Time 568.85 *** T1:	10.80	±	6.70  
  Treatment × time 572.45  ImpactT1:	0.87	±	9.08	ReferenceT1:	5.11	±	9.26 0.60,	0.96
Biological	crust	
cover
Gaussian  551.97  Intercept:	9.00	±	4.91  
 Treatment 554.89  Impact:	5.21	±	6.65,	Reference:	9.09	±	6.79  
 Time 554.91  T1:	8.80	±	5.49  
 Treatment × time 554.09 † ImpactT1:	0.49	±	7.44	ReferenceT1:	−13.66	±	7.59 0.18,	0.93
Weed	cover Gaussian  589.20  Intercept:	30.60	±	5.96  
  Treatment 590.68  Impact:	−10.31	±	8.07,	Reference:	−16.24	±	8.24  
 Time 582.04 ** T1:	−21.75	±	7.96  










Binomial  289.37  Intercept:	−2.92	±	0.00  
 Treatment 289.03  Impact:	0.10	±	0.00,	Reference:	0.14	±	0.00  
 Time 272.79 *** T1:	1.34	±	0.00  






TA B L E  1   (Continued)
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In	 addition	 to	 using	 the	 BACI	 design	 with	 independent,	 busi-
ness‐as‐usual	control	sites,	we	controlled	for	background	variability	
by	 focussing	 the	 study	on	one	broad	 vegetation	 type	 (woodlands	
with	a	grassy	understorey),	and	maximising	the	sample	size	within	
the	constraints	of	site	availability	and	vegetation	type.	Larger	sam-









This	 study	provides	 the	 first	example	of	evaluation	of	an	 incentive	
programme	for	restoration	of	remnant	native	vegetation	using	a	BACI	














itoring	 design	 enabled	 the	 separation	 of	 treatment	 effects	 from	





programme	 establishment	 phase.	We	 recommend	 the	 allocation	
of	appropriate	resources	for	monitoring	(appropriate	to	the	scale	
of	investment	and	level	of	outcome	uncertainty)	and	also	highlight	
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Appendix S1. Study region description 
The study region is within 80 km of the state capital city of Adelaide, and approximately 21% was 
residential land while 76% of land was used for primary production (DPTI 2016). Agricultural 
activities in the region were diverse and included livestock grazing and intensive livestock production, 
hay and silage production, viticulture, horticulture and broad-acre cropping (cereals and oilseed) 
(ABS 2016). Less than 10% of the region was covered by remnant native vegetation, and only 4% of 
this was protected in public protected areas such as Conservation Parks (DEWNR 2011; DEWNR 
2015). Three vegetation communities in the region are listed as critically endangered under the 
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999; Swamps of the Fleurieu Peninsula 
(Australian Government 2013), Iron-grass Natural Temperate Grassland of South Australia 
(Australian Government 2007), and Peppermint Box Eucalyptus odorata Grassy Woodland of South 
Australia (Australian Government 2007). 
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Appendix S2. Monthly rainfall recorded at the Palmer SA weather station 2005-2016, shown as 
deficit or surplus with respect to long term average. Data source (BOM 2018). NB data were not 




Bureau of Meteorology (2018) Monthly rainfall data, Palmer SA weather station (no. 024525). 




Appendix S3. Management actions identified in BushBids management plans for impact sites 






 No fertiliser application or artificial feeding,  
 No soil disturbance (beyond that which is necessary 
for agreed management actions),  
 No cropping,  
 No new dams,  
 No drainage alteration,  
 No rock removal. 
Compulsory 12 
Retain dead trees, fallen logs and plant litter Compulsory 12 
Manage grazing pressure from stock 
 Exclude stock from the site at all times or  
 Periodic biomass reduction/conservation grazing in 
grassy ecosystems. All stock must be removed in late 
spring / early summer when perennial native grasses 
begin to flower. Conservative grazing can resume 
after seed on native perennial grasses has matured. 
Compulsory 12 
Weed control Optional as a 
bundle, including 
all actions required 
to manage threats 
present at the site 
12 
Feral animal control 11 
Kangaroo control 4 
Supplementary planting 3 
Other threat management (e.g. prevent spread of 
Phytophthora cinnamomi, restrict vehicle access) 
2 
Permanent site protection, apply for a permanent covenant 
(Heritage Agreement) 
 
Optional 2a  
 
aNote that 7 impact sites had existing Heritage Agreements 
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Appendix S4. Weeds and feral animals targeted for control under BushBids management plans at 
impact sites. 
 
Weeds identified for control varied with site conditions but frequently included the following species 
African Daisy Senecio pterophorus,  
Blackberry Rubus species,  
Bridal Creeper Asparagus asparagoides,  
Broad-leaved Cotton-bush Gomphocarpus cancellatus, 
Gorse Ulex europaeus,  
Horehound Marrubium vulgare, 
South African Orchid Disa bracteata, 
Olive Olea europaea,  
Perennial Veldt Grass Ehrharta calycina,  
Pussy Tail Grass Pentameris pallida,  
Rose Rosa canina and R. rubiginosa, and 
Watsonia Watsonia meriana. 
 
Feral animals identified for control included  
European Rabbit Oryctolagus cuniculus,  
Brown Hare Lepus capensis,  
Deer e.g. Dama dama, Cervus elaphus,  
Goat Capra hircus, 
Red Fox Vulpes vulpes, and 
Cat Felis catus. 
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Appendix S5. Vegetation variables measured at study sites 
Variable Description Sampling unit 
  30 m x 30 m 
plot 
10 nearest 
trees to one 
plot corner 
Plant species presence List of all plants observed within plot.  
 
Native plant species 
richness 
















Grazing pressure The proportion of native plant species with 




Weed cover Visual estimate of cover (at ground level).  
 
Plant litter cover Visual estimate of cover.  
 
Biological crust cover Visual estimate of cover. Biological crust 
is defined here as the crust formed on the 
surface of soil and rock by organisms 
including bryophytes, lichens, algae, 
cyanobacteria and fungi.  
 
 
Canopy dieback Visual estimate of per cent canopy 




A single sample plot was located at each study site, with sites being patches of native vegetation. 
Vegetation condition variables such as weed cover were generally heterogeneous within sites and 
sample plots were situated in locations of roughly average condition for the site. Therefore, large 
changes in measured weed cover may not necessarily be expected within the sample plots because 




Appendix S6. (a) Ordination (PCoA) of sites based on plant taxonomic dissimilarity, (b) ordination 
(PCA) of sites based on vegetation condition variables. Condition variables include structural 
diversity index (StrDiv), species richness (SpRich), regeneration (Regen), log abundance (Logs) and 
weed cover (WeedC). T0 and T1 measures linked for each site. 
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Appendix S7. Partial residual plots for modelled effects of treatment and time (a) native plant species 
richness (Gaussian), (b) weed cover, (c) plant litter cover, (d) biological crust cover, (e) canopy 
dieback, (f) log abundance, (g) grazing pressure, and (h) regeneration. T0 shown in light grey and T1 
in dark grey. Model estimates are shown by horizontal lines and residuals are shown by points. Plots 
(a-e) use the scale of the original response variable, plots (f-h) use the scale of the linear predictor. 
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Increases in plant species richness and regeneration were likely 
due to the large rainfall events in the middle of the study 
period that brought an end to extended drought conditions. 
   
Log abundance increase The increase in log abundance may also have been a result of 
weather conditions including several severe wind events in the 
twelve months leading up to the final assessments and the high 
rainfall of 2010-2011 which may have increased tree 
vulnerability to wind damage via ground softening or increases 
in pests and pathogens. 
   
Weed cover 
Plant litter cover 
decrease 
increase 
The decrease in weed cover and increase in plant litter cover 
are likely to be a result of the unusually dry conditions in 
spring 2015, immediately preceding the final assessment. This 
meant that at the time of the final assessments annual grassy 
weeds had mostly died off and were assessed as plant litter 
cover rather than weed cover. 
   
Biological crust decrease at 
reference 
sites 
Increased plant litter cover may also explain the decrease in 
biological crust cover recorded at reference sites, as plant litter 
cover may inhibit biological crust (Read et al. 2008) and/or 
may have prevented detection of a proportion of the biological 
crust cover present. 
   
Canopy dieback increase The increase in canopy dieback may have been an episodic 
event in response to the dry spring conditions preceding the 
final assessment. However concern about long term decline in 
tree health has been raised for Pink Gum Eucalyptus 
fasciculosa in the study region (Ward 2005), and many other 
eucalypts in southern Australia (Jurskis 2005), suggesting 
further investigation of long term trends in tree health is 
needed. 
   
Grazing pressure increase Increase in grazing pressure across impact and control sites 
may have also been influenced by dry spring conditions in 
2015 along with longer term responses such as increases in 
native and feral herbivores in response to the 2010-2011 
rainfall events (DEWNR 2015). 
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Constraints on available land and funding are hindering land-based carbon emissions 16 
reduction and biodiversity conservation1,2. Avoided deforestation, reforestation and 17 
restoration can simultaneously reduce carbon emissions and conserve biodiversity, 18 
potentially offering efficient solutions for these resource constraints3. However, when 19 
avoided deforestation and reforestation prioritize carbon outcomes, biodiversity 20 
outcomes can be suboptimal, uncertain or even negative4-6. Restoration of remnant 21 
native vegetation may provide an opportunity to prioritize biodiversity outcomes while 22 
harnessing carbon markets for concurrent production of carbon and biodiversity 23 
benefits. Here we demonstrate that carbon sequestered by restoring temperate remnant 24 
woodland can pay the cost of the restored biodiversity. This is shown using plausible 25 
scenarios of vegetation age and ecosystem degradation rate, conservative carbon prices 26 
in an established market (the world’s largest for forest-based emissions reductions), and 27 
the restoration cost revealed by a 10-year conservation incentive payment scheme. 28 
When recovery rates are high, market rates for carbon can pay the full cost of 29 
restoration, with additional independent investment needed in cases where recovery 30 
trajectories are slower. The use of carbon markets to fund restoration provides a 31 
solution for constrained resources and problematic trade-offs between carbon and 32 
biodiversity outcomes. Multi-attribute markets offer the potential to greatly increase 33 
the extent of restoration for biodiversity conservation, while providing an affordable 34 
source of carbon sequestration.  35 
  36 
Climate change and biodiversity loss are arguably the greatest environmental challenges 37 
currently facing humanity7-9. Land use has a critical role to play in both climate change 38 
mitigation3 and biodiversity conservation10, however there are competing demands on land 39 
for the provision of these and other ecosystem services1. The establishment of carbon markets 40 
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is beginning to provide funds for carbon emissions abatement including land based carbon 41 
sequestration11, however there are few examples of similar regulatory mechanisms for 42 
biodiversity conservation12, despite large shortfalls in conservation funding 2.  43 
 44 
Land-based interventions to reduce carbon emissions, such as avoided deforestation and 45 
reforestation, have potential to provide co-benefits for biodiversity. However, when these 46 
interventions are optimized for carbon outcomes, biodiversity outcomes may be suboptimal 47 
or even negative5,6,13. Furthermore, concerns have been raised about the certainty of 48 
biodiversity benefits from plantings4 and the timescales required for such benefits to be 49 
realized14. Approaches to improve biodiversity outcomes from avoided deforestation and 50 
carbon plantings have been suggested but may require trade-offs in carbon outcomes15. These 51 
approaches include improved planning to optimize carbon and biodiversity outcomes5,16,17 52 
and additional markets or other investment to purchase biodiversity outcomes16,18. In the 53 
absence of strong regulatory or market mechanisms specifically for biodiversity, biodiversity 54 
outcomes may remain a secondary concern in forest-sector emissions reduction investment. 55 
However, restoration of remnant native vegetation could offer a way to optimize biodiversity 56 
outcomes from investment in carbon emissions reduction, while avoiding potential trade-offs 57 
in carbon outcomes. 58 
 59 
Here we investigate whether carbon markets could pay for biodiversity conservation in 60 
Australia’s Emissions Reduction Fund (ERF), the trading scheme which accounted for the 61 
majority of the world’s traded forest-based emissions reductions in 2015 and 201619. We 62 
model carbon sequestered through restoration of temperate remnant native vegetation under 63 
10-year contracts from a revealed-price conservation incentive payment scheme20. The 64 
conservation incentive scheme was located in the Mt Lofty Ranges, a peri-urban region in 65 
56
South Australia, recognized as a center of plant biodiversity21. Restoration contracts were 66 
initiated in 2006 and 2007, and required management of grazing pressure from stock and 67 
feral animals, weed control, and retention of fallen logs20. Using the FullCAM model, which 68 
is employed in ERF carbon accounting methodologies, we estimate carbon sequestered under 69 
nine plausible scenarios. Each scenario includes one of three fire (or clearance) events 70 
aligned with major historical wildfires in the study environment and one of three ecosystem 71 
degradation rates (Table 1). These ecosystem degradation rates (modeled as discounted 72 
growth rates) were used to represent the effects of degrading processes such as grazing 73 
pressure from feral animals, weed invasion and firewood collection. Using two recent carbon 74 
prices (AUD$12 and AUD$23 tCO2e
-1), we compare the value of the carbon sequestered by 75 
restoration to the average cost of restoration revealed through the conservation incentive 76 
scheme (AUD$59 ha-1 yr-1). 77 
 78 
Table 1. Modeled scenarios with year of last fire and degradation rate  79 
 Degradation rate (proportion of standard growth rate) 















 (1983) 1983, high 1983, medium 1983, low 
 (1955) 1955, high 1955, medium 1955, low 





Figure 1. Modeled carbon in plants and debris at a typical study site, with and without 83 
restoration beginning in 2006, under the 1955 fire, medium degradation scenario. Time 84 
period 1900-2030 shown at (a), time period 1996-2026 shown at (b). 85 
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 86 
We found that sequestered carbon can pay a substantial proportion of the restoration cost 87 
under plausible scenarios of vegetation age and degradation rate, with carbon prices at levels 88 
recently posted in the carbon market (Figure 2). The full cost of restoration can be covered by 89 
carbon sequestration alone when recovery rates are high (e.g. scenarios with 1983 or 1955 90 
fire/clearance and high degradation rate). In other scenarios, carbon sequestration can pay a 91 
substantial proportion of the restoration cost, but additional, independent investment is also 92 
required.  93 
 94 
 95 
Figure 2. Mean (±SE) percent of 10-year restoration cost covered by carbon sequestered 96 
under modeled scenarios, with carbon price at AUD$23 tCO2e
-1 and AUD$12 tCO2e
-1 (n=12) 97 
 98 
We used time since fire (or clearance), and degradation rate to model a range of vegetation 99 
recovery rates. Younger vegetation with a higher growth rate, and therefore a higher recovery 100 
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rate, provided more sequestered carbon over the 10-year restoration period. Higher rates of 101 
degradation also provided higher recovery rates under modeled scenarios because we 102 
assumed degrading processes were completely negated by restoration. Average rates of 103 
carbon sequestration estimated here ranged from less than 0.1 tC ha-1 yr-1 to 1.5 tC ha-1 yr-1. 104 
The mid point of this range falls within an independently estimated range for carbon 105 
sequestration potential in temperate Australian woodlands (0.35-0.77 tC ha-1 yr-1)22. 106 
Degradation and recovery are likely to depend on fire and management history in addition to 107 
productivity22. While site productivity is already accounted for in FullCAM models, 108 
strategies to account for fire and management history will be required in methodologies for 109 
estimating carbon sequestration from remnant native vegetation restoration.  110 
 111 
Carbon price has a large influence on the proportion of restoration cost that can be covered by 112 
carbon markets. Here we used two prices for carbon, the lowest (AUD$12 tCO2e
-1) is the 113 
average price paid by the ERF for the eight auctions which purchased 193 Mt CO2e between 114 
2015 and 2018 inclusive23. This is a conservative price, driven by the ERF policy principle to 115 
purchase the lowest cost carbon abatement24. In practice these emissions reductions have 116 
largely been from two vegetation methods; avoided deforestation and assisted natural 117 
regeneration (ANR) on marginal land requiring little management intervention to assist 118 
regeneration25,26. The second price used here (AUD$23 tCO2e
-1) is the initial price set by the 119 
Australian Government under the Clean Energy Act 2011 which came into effect on the 1st 120 
July 2012 and was repealed two years later27. These carbon prices are at the lower end of the 121 
global range of carbon prices28 and are well below the estimated median social cost of carbon 122 
emissions (US$400 tCO2e
-1)29. At AUD$12 tCO2e
-1, supply of carbon sequestration through 123 
planting has been very limited in southern Australia, with estimates showing that prices of at 124 
least AUD$50 tCO2e
-1 would be required to increase supply18.  125 
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 126 
While presenting these findings we note a number of caveats. Firstly, the modeled carbon 127 
shown here includes only carbon in plants (above and below-ground biomass) and debris. 128 
The inclusion of soil carbon pools may increase estimates, especially over longer time 129 
periods22,30. We used the FullCAM model, which is employed by approved methodologies for 130 
assessing carbon credits under the ERF, however no methodology for restoration of remnant 131 
native vegetation had been approved at the time of writing. In the absence of a FullCAM 132 
model specific to the study system we used one that was considered to provide a realistic 133 
substitute (please refer to methods section below for details). Further refinement and 134 
calibration of modeling and methodologies may therefore improve the accuracy of carbon 135 
sequestration estimates. We also acknowledge that restoration of remnant vegetation will not 136 
necessarily produce carbon benefits if restoration transitions vegetation from higher to lower 137 
carbon stocks (e.g. forest to grassland). Finally, while coupling carbon sequestration and 138 
biodiversity services in this way offers potential benefits, careful policy design will be 139 
required to minimize transaction costs and overcome other challenges presented by 140 
asynchronous carbon and biodiversity markets and policies. 141 
 142 
We have shown here that carbon sequestration can pay for restoration under conservative 143 
carbon prices with plausible ecosystem degradation and recovery rates. This presents an 144 
opportunity to increase the extent of restoration within constrained budgets for biodiversity 145 
conservation. It also offers an affordable source of carbon sequestration with demonstrated 146 
biodiversity benefits. The use of carbon markets to fund remnant native vegetation restoration 147 
thereby provides a means to prioritize biodiversity outcomes in forest based carbon emissions 148 
reduction, and overcome challenges posed by constrained resources for climate change and 149 
biodiversity loss mitigation. To enable trading of carbon sequestered through restoration, 150 
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suitable regulatory and policy conditions are required, including regulatory frameworks for 151 
carbon markets and methodologies to calculate carbon sequestrated by restoration.  152 
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Methods 153 
The conservation incentive scheme 154 
This study uses a conservation incentive scheme, Eastern Mt Lofty Ranges BushBids, as a 155 
case study. Briefly, this scheme invited private landholders to tender a price for 10-year 156 
contracts for restoration of remnant native vegetation. Contracts were established in 2006 and 157 
2007 and management actions included retention of fallen logs, exclusion or management of 158 
domestic stock grazing, weed control, and control of grazing pressure from feral and over-159 
abundant native animals. For further details of the BushBids project see Bond, et al. 31 and 160 
Bond, et al. 20. The average cost of the restoration contracts was (AUD$59 ha-1 yr-1)32. 161 
 162 
Study area and sites 163 
The study area is within the eastern Mt Lofty Ranges of South Australia and has a temperate 164 
climate with a wide ranging annual average rainfall between approximately 290 mm in the 165 
north east and approximately 890 mm in the south west33. The area’s native vegetation 166 
mainly consists of eucalypt dominated forests and woodlands and has been reduced to less 167 
than 10 % of its former extent34. We modeled carbon sequestration at twelve woodland sites 168 
contracted through the BushBids project. 169 
 170 
FullCAM model and Emission Reduction Fund (ERF) methodology 171 
To estimate carbon sequestration through restoration of remnant native vegetation, we used 172 
the FullCAM model, version 4.0.3.2635 which was developed by the Australian Government 173 
for national carbon accounting. At the time of this study, no methodologies for management 174 
or restoration of remnant woodlands had been approved under the ERF. We therefore 175 
designed a modeling procedure following relevant components of approved methodologies 176 
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“Reforestation by Environmental or Mallee Plantings - FullCAM” and “Human-induced 177 
regeneration of a permanent even-aged native forest 1.1”36-38. 178 
 179 
Model settings and scenarios  180 
Carbon sequestration from restoration was estimated by subtracting modeled carbon stocks 181 
under a business-as-usual scenario from modeled carbon stocks under a restoration scenario 182 
at the conclusion of a 10-year restoration period (2006-2016). Three historical fire (or 183 
clearance) scenarios were included to model plausible growth or recovery rates. Additionally, 184 
three levels of degradation were used to simulate the effects of degrading processes such as 185 
stock grazing, grazing by feral animals and over-abundant native animals as well as weed 186 
invasion and fire-wood collection (further detailed below). All simulations were initiated in 187 
the year 1606 to allow a period of more than 300 years for stabilisation of carbon stocks prior 188 
to modeled events including fire, degradation and restoration. 189 
 190 
The study landscape and its temperate woodlands are relatively fire prone with fire frequency 191 
estimated to be multi-decadal39,40. To represent the range of vegetation age since fire in the 192 
study area, we used three historic major wildfire events; 1983, 1955 and 193941.  The forest 193 
treatment “age advance” was used to model ecosystem degradation and was effectively a 194 
growth setback. It was initiated in 1946, in line with post-World War II agricultural 195 
intensification in southern Australia42 for the earliest fire scenario and three years after fire in 196 
the more recent fire scenarios. In 2006, at the start of the restoration period, degradation was 197 
removed to simulate the mitigating effects of restoration. Estimated 2016 carbon stocks were 198 
then compared to an otherwise identical scenario where degradation continued. We selected 199 
three plausible degradation levels including growth setback of; 3 in 4 years (0.25 times 200 
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standard growth rate), 1 in 2 years (0.5 times standard growth rate), and 1 in 4 years (0.75 201 
times standard growth rate).  202 
 203 
We used the “Mixed species environmental planting–temperate” model within FullCAM, 204 
with a geometric block planting of 500-1500 plants per ha with trees making up at least 75 % 205 
of plants. FullCAM’s “mixed species environmental planting-temperate” model was recently 206 
refined and calibrated43,44, and was considered to be the most suitable for this study in the 207 
absence of appropriate, calibrated models specifically for remnant woodland in the study 208 
area. Empirical data collected at the study sites showed that, with a mean of approximately 209 
400 trees ha-1, tree density was at the lower boundary (375 trees ha-1) of the specified range in 210 
the model parameter selected (500-1500 plants ha-1 and >75% trees). 211 
 212 
Data analysis and presentation 213 
Data analysis was performed in R45 and plots created with the ggplot2 package46. 214 
 215 
Data availability 216 
Data generated during the current study and R code used for analysis are available in the 217 
Figshare repository https://doi.org/10.25909/5cf08c6820044. These data were used to create 218 
figures 1 and 2. To protect the privacy of conservation incentive scheme participants, spatial 219 
location of study sites has been withheld. 220 
 221 
Competing interests  222 
Prior to conducting this research, PJO’C & AJB were employed by O’Connor NRM Pty Ltd 223 
in the design and implementation of the BushBids program. 224 
 225 
65
Author Contributions  226 
PJOC conceived the study. AJB conducted analyses and led the writing of the manuscript. 227 




We wish to acknowledge advice provided by Dr Keryn Paul, Trevor Hobbs, Dr David 232 
Summers and Dr Sean Smukler. AJB’s research was supported by a postgraduate research 233 
scholarship from the School of Agriculture Food and Wine at The University of Adelaide, a 234 
supplementary scholarship from the Department for Environment and Water, and an 235 
Australia Awards Endeavour Research Fellowship. 236 
  237 
66
References 238 
1 Smith, P. et al. in Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution 239 
of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel 240 
on Climate Change   (eds O. Edenhofer et al.) Ch. Agriculture, Forestry and Other 241 
Land Use (AFOLU), 811-922 (Cambridge University Press, 2014). 242 
2 Waldron, A. et al. Reductions in global biodiversity loss predicted from conservation 243 
spending. Nature 551, 364-367, doi:10.1038/nature24295 (2017). 244 
3 Griscom, B. W. et al. Natural climate solutions. Proceedings of the National Academy 245 
of Sciences of the United States of America 114, 11645-11650, 246 
doi:10.1073/pnas.1710465114 (2017). 247 
4 Maron, M. et al. Faustian bargains? Restoration realities in the context of biodiversity 248 
offset policies. Biological Conservation 155, 141-148, 249 
doi:10.1016/j.biocon.2012.06.003 (2012). 250 
5 Ferreira, J. et al. Carbon-focused conservation may fail to protect the most biodiverse 251 
tropical forests. Nature Climate Change 8, 744-749, doi:10.1038/s41558-018-0225-7 252 
(2018). 253 
6 Lindenmayer, D. B. et al. Avoiding bio-perversity from carbon sequestration 254 
solutions. Conserv. Lett. 5, 28-36, doi:10.1111/j.1755-263X.2011.00213.x (2012). 255 
7 Rockström, J. et al. A safe operating space for humanity. Nature 461, 472-475, 256 
doi:10.1038/461472a (2009). 257 
8 Convention on Biological Diversity. Conference of the Parties Decision X/2: 258 
Strategic plan for biodiversity 2011-2020., <www.cbd.int/decision/cop?id=12268> 259 
(2010). 260 
9 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. in Global Warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC 261 
Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels 262 
67
and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening 263 
the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and 264 
efforts to eradicate poverty (eds V. Masson-Delmotte et al.) Ch. Summary for 265 
Policymakers, (World Meteorological Organization, 2018). 266 
10 Kehoe, L. et al. Biodiversity at risk under future cropland expansion and 267 
intensification. Nature Ecology and Evolution 1, 1129-1135, doi:10.1038/s41559-268 
017-0234-3 (2017). 269 
11 World Bank, Ecofys & Vivid Economics. State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2017. 270 
(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2017). 271 
12 Madsen, B., Carroll, N. & Moore Brands, K. State of Biodiversity Markets Report: 272 
Offset and Compensation Programs Worldwide. (Ecosystem Marketplace, 273 
Washington, DC, 2010). 274 
13 Venter, O. et al. Harnessing carbon payments to protect biodiversity. Science 326, 275 
1368, doi:10.1126/science.1180289 (2009). 276 
14 Munro, N. T. et al. Bird's Response to Revegetation of Different Structure and 277 
Floristics-Are "Restoration Plantings" Restoring Bird Communities? Restoration 278 
Ecology 19, 223-235, doi:10.1111/j.1526-100X.2010.00703.x (2011). 279 
15 Anderson-Teixeira, K. J. Prioritizing biodiversity and carbon. Nature Climate Change 280 
8, 667-668, doi:10.1038/s41558-018-0242-6 (2018). 281 
16 Phelps, J., Webb, E. L. & Adams, W. M. Biodiversity co-benefits of policies to 282 
reduce forest-carbon emissions. Nature Climate Change 2, 497-503, 283 
doi:10.1038/nclimate1462 (2012). 284 
17 Di Marco, M., Watson, J. E. M., Currie, D. J., Possingham, H. P. & Venter, O. The 285 
extent and predictability of the biodiversity–carbon correlation. Ecology Letters 21, 286 
365-375, doi:10.1111/ele.12903 (2018). 287 
68
18 Bryan, B. A. et al. Supply of carbon sequestration and biodiversity services from 288 
Australia's agricultural land under global change. Global Environmental Change 28, 289 
166-181, doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2014.06.013 (2014). 290 
19 Hamrick, K. & Gallant, M. Fertile Ground Sate of Forest Carbon Finance 2017. 291 
(Ecosystem Marketplace, Washington, DC, 2017). 292 
20 Bond, A. J., O'Connor, P. J. & Cavagnaro, T. R. Remnant woodland biodiversity 293 
gains under 10 years of revealed-price incentive payments. Journal of Applied 294 
Ecology 56, 1827-1838, doi:10.1111/1365-2664.13397 (2019). 295 
21 Guerin, G. R., Biffin, E., Baruch, Z. & Lowe, A. J. Identifying centres of plant 296 
biodiversity in South Australia. PLoS One 11, doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0144779 297 
(2016). 298 
22 Paul, K. et al. Potential for Carbon Abatement through Restoration of Australian 299 
Woodlands. Report for Department of the Environment and Energy. (CSIRO 300 
Agriculture, Canberra, Australia, 2016). 301 
23 Australian Government. Emissions Resudction Fund Auction Results, 302 
<http://www.cleanenergyregulator.gov.au/ERF/Auctions-results> (2018). 303 
24 Australian Government. Emissions Reduction Fund White Paper. (Department of the 304 
Environment and Energy, Canberra, Australia, 2014). 305 
25 Burke, P. J. Undermined by Adverse Selection: Australia's Direct Action Abatement 306 
Subsidies. Economic Papers 35, 216-229, doi:10.1111/1759-3441.12138 (2016). 307 
26 Evans, M. C. Effective incentives for reforestation: lessons from Australia's carbon 308 
farming policies. Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability 32, 38-45, 309 
doi:10.1016/j.cosust.2018.04.002 (2018). 310 
69
27 Crowley, K. Up and down with climate politics 2013–2016: the repeal of carbon 311 
pricing in Australia. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change 8, 312 
doi:10.1002/wcc.458 (2017). 313 
28 The World Bank. Carbon Pricing Dashboard, 314 
<https://carbonpricingdashboard.worldbank.org/map_data> (2019). 315 
29 Ricke, K., Drouet, L., Caldeira, K. & Tavoni, M. Country-level social cost of carbon. 316 
Nature Climate Change 8, 895-900, doi:10.1038/s41558-018-0282-y (2018). 317 
30 Paul, K. I. et al. Using measured stocks of biomass and litter carbon to constrain 318 
modelled estimates of sequestration of soil organic carbon under contrasting mixed-319 
species environmental plantings. Science of the Total Environment 615, 348-359, 320 
doi:10.1016/j.scitotenv.2017.09.263 (2018). 321 
31 Bond, A. J., O'Connor, P. J. & Cavagnaro, T. R. Who participates in conservation 322 
incentive programs? Absentee and group landholders are in the mix. Land Use Policy 323 
72, 410-419, doi:10.1016/j.landusepol.2017.12.067 (2018). 324 
32 O’Connor, P., Morgan, A. & Bond, A. BushBids: Biodiversity Stewardship in the 325 
Eastern Mount Lofty Ranges, South Australia. (O'Connor NRM Pty Ltd, South 326 
Australia, 2008). 327 
33 Bureau of Meteorology. Mean monthly, seasonal and annual rainfall data (base 328 
climatological data sets). (Bureau of Meteorology, Australia, 2014). 329 
34 Department of Environment Water and Natural Resources. Native Vegetation 330 
Floristic Areas - NVIS - Statewide (Incomplete Version). (Department of 331 
Environment Water and Natural Resources, South Australia, 2011). 332 
35 Richards, G. P. & Evans, D. M. W. Development of a carbon accounting model 333 
(FullCAM Vers. 1.0) for the Australian continent. Australian Forestry 67, 277-283, 334 
doi:10.1080/00049158.2004.10674947 (2004). 335 
70
36 Department of the Environment and Energy. Emissions Reduction Fund Methods, 336 
<http://www.environment.gov.au/climate-change/government/emissions-reduction-337 
fund/methods> (2018). 338 
37 Department of the Environment and Energy. Requirements for using the Full Carbon 339 
Accounting Model (FullCAM) in the Emissions Reduction Fund (ERF) methodology 340 
determination: Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming Initiative) (Reforestation by 341 
Environmental or Mallee Plantings—FullCAM) Methodology Determination 2014 342 
Version 2.0. (Australian Government Department of the Environment and Energy, 343 
Canberra, Australia, 2016). 344 
38 Department of the Environment and Energy. Requirements for using the Full Carbon 345 
Accounting Model (FullCAM) in the Emissions Reduction Fund (ERF) methodology 346 
determination: Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming Initiative) (Human Induced 347 
Regeneration of a Permanent Even Aged Native Forest—1.1) Methodology 348 
Determination 2013 Version 2.0. (Department of the Environment and Energy, 349 
Canberra, Australia, 2016). 350 
39 Bradstock, R. A. A biogeographic model of fire regimes in Australia: Current and 351 
future implications. Global Ecology and Biogeography 19, 145-158, 352 
doi:10.1111/j.1466-8238.2009.00512.x (2010). 353 
40 Hobbs, R. in Flammable Australia   (eds Ross A. Bradstock, Jann E. Williams, & A. 354 
Malxolm Gill) Ch. Fire regimes and their effects in Australian temperte woodlands, 355 
305-326 (Cambridge University Press, 2002). 356 
41 Healey, D. T. in The Economics of Bushfires: The South Australian Experience   (eds 357 
Derek T. Healey, F. G. Jarrett, & J.M. McKay) Ch. Introduction, (Oxford University 358 
Press, 1985). 359 
71
42 Duncan, D. H. & Dorrough, J. W. Historical and current land use shape landscape 360 
restoration options in the Australian wheat and sheep farming zone. Landscape and 361 
Urban Planning 91, 124-132, doi:10.1016/j.landurbplan.2008.12.007 (2009). 362 
43 Paul, K. et al. Improved estimation of biomass accumulation by environmental 363 
planting and mallee plantings using FullCAM. (CSIRO Sustainable Agriculture 364 
Flagship, Canberra, Australia, 2013). 365 
44 Paul, K. I. et al. Improved models for estimating temporal changes in carbon 366 
sequestration in above-ground biomass of mixed-species environmental plantings. 367 
Forest Ecology and Management 338, 208-218, doi:10.1016/j.foreco.2014.11.025 368 
(2015). 369 
45 R Core Team. R: A language and environment for statistical computing., (Vienna, 370 
Austria, 2017). 371 
46 Wickham, H. ggplot2: Elegant Graphics for Data Analysis. (Springer-Verlag, New 372 





Chapter 5. Money matters for retention and post-





Money matters for retention and post-contract management persistence in conservation 2 
incentive programs 3 
 4 
Authors 5 
Anthelia J. Bond a *, Patrick J. O’Connorb and Timothy R. Cavagnaroa 6 
 7 
Affiliations 8 
aThe Waite Research Institute, and The School of Agriculture, Food and Wine, The 9 
University of Adelaide, The Waite Campus, PMB 1 Glen Osmond, South Australia, 5064, 10 
Australia. 11 
bThe Centre for Global Food and Resources, The University of Adelaide, South Australia, 12 
5005, Australia. 13 
 14 
*Corresponding author 15 
Email: anthelia.bond@adelaide.edu.au Phone: +61 8 8313 6530 16 
The School of Agriculture, Food and Wine, The University of Adelaide, The Waite Campus, 17 
PMB 1 Glen Osmond, South Australia, 5064, Australia. 18 
 19 
Author email addresses 20 
Patrick J. O’Connor patrick.oconnor@adelaide.edu.au 21 
Timothy R. Cavagnaro timothy.cavagnaro@adelaide.edu.au 22 
 23 
Running title: conservation persistence after incentives 24 
75
Keywords: agri-environment scheme, conservation behaviour, disadoption, discontinuance, 25 
incentive program, land manager, reversion 26 
 27 
Manuscript details 28 
Target journal: Conservation Letters 29 
Article type: Letter 30 
Abstract word count: 135 31 
Manuscript word count (abstract to acknowledgements exl figs, tables, captions): 3,091 (note 32 
that participant quotations have also been excluded from the word count) 33 
References: 40 34 
Figures (max 6 figures & tables): 1  35 
Tables:  4  36 
76
Abstract 37 
Voluntary incentive programs are widely used in private land conservation, however their 38 
effectiveness relies on retaining participants for the full term of the incentive contract and on 39 
what happens after these contracts expire. A theory outlining the factors that may support 40 
post-contract persistence (continuation of incentivised land management) has been proposed 41 
by Dayer et al. (2018). However, few empirical studies have explored post-contract 42 
persistence, and to our knowledge, none have interpreted findings within the framework of 43 
relative private costs and benefits. We evaluate the proposed theory of persistence, using 44 
interview and questionnaire data from participants at the conclusion of ten-year, revealed-45 
price, incentive contracts for conservation of remnant native vegetation. We find that net 46 
private benefits or costs were critical determinants for persistence. In some circumstances 47 
persistence cannot be expected in the absence of ongoing financial support for private 48 
landholders.   49 
77
1. Introduction 50 
Protection and restoration of natural habitat on private land is essential for meeting global 51 
biodiversity conservation goals (IPBES 2019; Knight 1999). However, management and 52 
opportunity costs can present a major barrier to the adoption of conservation practices on 53 
private land. In situations where the private cost of conservation outweighs the private 54 
benefits, incentives can be used to overcome this barrier (Doremus 2003; Pannell 2008). 55 
Currently, incentive payments (through voluntary incentive programs) are widely used to 56 
purchase conservation management services from private landholders (Batáry et al. 2015; 57 
Doremus 2003; Kamal et al. 2015; Riffell et al. 2008; Rolfe et al. 2017).  58 
There has been much research attention given to landholder motivations for participation in 59 
voluntary conservation programs (e.g. Brodt et al. 2009; Farmer et al. 2015; Lastra-Bravo et 60 
al. 2015; Moon and Cocklin 2011), information which is important for the design of effective 61 
landholder engagement strategies. However, the ability to retain landholders in voluntary 62 
programs is also central to program effectiveness (Knight et al. 2010; Selinske et al. 2015). 63 
Research on factors influencing retention in conservation programs has been more limited to 64 
date, but has identified a similar suite of factors to those linked with motivations for 65 
participation. Factors linked to retention include: interactions with program staff (Selinske et 66 
al. 2015); trust in the program delivery agency (Lutter et al. 2019); larger property sizes or 67 
enrolled areas (Defrancesco et al. 2018; Farmer et al. 2017); younger landholders 68 
(Defrancesco et al. 2018); pro-environmental attitudes (Farmer et al. 2017; Lutter et al. 69 
2019); social norms (actions or attitudes of landholders in the neighbourhood) (Chen et al. 70 
2009; Defrancesco et al. 2018); and observation of positive environmental changes (Farmer 71 
et al. 2017).  72 
A case has also been made that conservation incentive programs aim to engender 73 
“persistence”, that is, the continuation of conservation actions or behaviour after incentive 74 
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payments stop (Dayer et al. 2018). The idea that incentive programs may lead to persistence 75 
appears to contradict economic theory underpinning payments for ecosystem services (PES), 76 
which indicates that continuation of conservation actions cannot be expected when payments 77 
cease (Engel et al. 2008). Noting meagre empirical research in this area, Dayer et al. (2018) 78 
proposed five factors that may contribute to persistence: cognitions (e.g. attitudes and 79 
perceptions); sustaining motivations; habit forming; social norms; and resources. Empirical 80 
studies have found that persistence is most likely for actions where ongoing costs are low 81 
(Jackson-Smith et al. 2010; Kuhfuss et al. 2016; Roberts and Lubowski 2007). Persistence 82 
has also been linked to actions which provide private benefits such as social 83 
acknowledgement, satisfaction and social connection (Kuhfuss et al. 2016; Ramsdell et al. 84 
2016). Where persistence was unlikely, this was because perceived benefits were insufficient 85 
(Hayes 2012) or costs of continuing action where too high (Race and Curtis 2013). 86 
Given that economic theory indicates incentives are useful when private costs outweigh 87 
private benefits (Doremus 2003; Pannell 2008), it would be expected that retention and 88 
persistence are influenced by net private benefits (private benefits minus costs). However, 89 
studies to date have not framed their findings in this way, and few have specifically explored 90 
the role and influence of management costs. A further limitation of the research relating to 91 
retention and persistence in private land conservation is its focus on fixed-price, cost-share or 92 
tax relief incentive programs. Moreover there has been very limited attention given to 93 
revealed-price incentive programs where participants bid for conservation contracts in reverse 94 
auctions. These types of programs are better able to accommodate heterogeneity in 95 
management and opportunity costs (Rolfe et al. 2017) and may therefore engage a different 96 
set of landholders with differing motivations and behaviours (Bond et al. 2018; Whitten et al. 97 
2013; Wünscher and Wunder 2017). 98 
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Here we investigate retention and post incentive contract management persistence in a 99 
revealed-price conservation incentive program. The program offered private landholders ten-100 
year incentive contracts to restore remnant native vegetation in a peri-urban, agricultural 101 
landscape in southern Australia. We use data from semi-structured interviews and a 102 
questionnaire to identify participant response to cost uncertainty, perceived benefits from 103 
participation and the implications for retention and post-contract persistence. We evaluate the 104 
theory of post-contract persistence proposed by Dayer et al. (2018), finding that net private 105 
benefits or costs were the key limiting factor for persistence.  106 
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2. Research methods and context 107 
This study examines the views and experiences of participants in a revealed-price incentive 108 
program, Eastern Mt Lofty Ranges BushBids. The study area spans approximately 3 000 km2 109 
in the Mt Lofty Ranges, South Australia. This area is a peri-urban to rural landscape with 110 
approximately 21% being residential land and 76% of land used for primary production 111 
(DPTI 2016). Agricultural activities include livestock grazing and intensive production, hay 112 
and silage production, viticulture, horticulture and broad-acre cropping (cereals and oilseed) 113 
(ABS 2016). The area has been recognised as a centre of plant biodiversity (Guerin et al. 114 
2016), and has less than 10% of the original native vegetation cover remaining (DEWNR 115 
2011).  116 
The BushBids program aimed to support private landholders to maintain or restore the 117 
ecological function of remnant native vegetation (Bond et al. 2018). In 2006 and 2007 the 118 
program offered five or ten-year contracts to landholders through a discriminant price, 119 
reverse auction. More than 2 000 ha of native vegetation were placed under contract with 39 120 
landholders for AU$1.2M in incentive payments (O’Connor et al. 2008). Under these 121 
contracts, landholders agreed to a comprehensive set of vegetation management actions 122 
which included: minimising soil and vegetation disturbance; retaining fallen logs; managing 123 
grazing pressure from livestock; controlling weeds and feral animals (in most cases); and 124 
controlling kangaroos (in some cases). Contracted landholders were required to report on the 125 
implementation of contracted actions annually, with annual incentive payments conditional 126 
on satisfactory reporting and compliance audits. Further details of the program are provided 127 
in (Bond et al. 2018; Bond et al. 2019). 128 
Landholders who had expressed interest in BushBids and/or with current BushBids contracts 129 
were interviewed and surveyed between June 2016 and August 2018. Eligible landholders for 130 
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this study included those who were nearing the end of their ten-year contracts as well as 131 
landholders without BushBids contracts who had made unsuccessful bids in the auction or 132 
had withdrawn from the program before bidding. All eligible landholders who had agreed to 133 
be contacted by the researchers were invited to participate in this study. Semi-structured 134 
interviews were conducted in person or by telephone to obtain information about the 135 
participant’s experience managing their remnant native vegetation and their views about 136 
management in the future (see S1, supporting information, for interview guides). Interviews 137 
also collected demographic information (see S2 for summary). Attempts were made to 138 
interview all 26 landholders who had agreed to be contacted by the researchers, however five 139 
could not be reached, or verbally agreed to the interview but did not provide the necessary 140 
written consent. Seventeen of the 21 interviews were conducted with contracted landholders 141 
while four were conducted with landholders without contracts. A follow up questionnaire was 142 
used to elicit a hypothetical bid price for native vegetation management over the next ten-143 
year period (see S3 for questionnaire). As the questionnaire asked for separate prices for 144 
managing  grazing pressure, weeds and other threats, transactions costs (such as the cost of 145 
reporting) may not have been included in responses. Bid estimates may therefore be slightly 146 
conservative. Eleven questionnaire responses were received from participants with contracts 147 
(response rate 65%). This study also used existing data from the conservation incentive 148 
program. 149 
Descriptive statistics were used to analyse quantitative data from interviews and 150 
questionnaires. Previous bid prices were adjusted for inflation between 2006 and 2016 using 151 
the Australian Bureau of Statistics inflation calculator (ABS 2019) and are shown as 2016 152 
dollar values. Interview transcripts were coded for content using NVivo and plots were made 153 
using the ggplot2 package (Wickham 2009) in  R (R Core Team 2017).  154 
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3. Results 155 
Bidders used their own time to increase competitiveness and to compensate for 156 
incomplete information. 157 
The majority of participants reported that the actual cost of materials was less than or close to 158 
the cost for materials that was included in their bid price (Table 1). The cost of hired labour 159 
was less accurately matched with the bid price, with few participants reporting that the actual 160 
cost of hired labour was close to the cost included in the bid, and both negative and positive 161 
differences in costs reported. All participants used their own labour to implement 162 
management actions and most reported that the amount of their own time used was more than 163 
the amount included in their bid price. 164 
There were two key reasons for the difference between actual costs and bid price reported by 165 
participants. Firstly, participants reported having incomplete information about the costs at 166 
the time of bidding, illustrated by the following quotation. 167 
“I’d estimated in there, the time, as in wages, to do certain jobs, but didn’t allow 168 
for the fact that it was such rugged terrain and a lot of time was packing up and 169 
getting to the job, not so much on the job.” (Landholder 14) 170 
Secondly, many participants reported that, in order to increase their bid’s competitiveness, 171 
they did not include the full cost of management in their bid. Participants commonly used 172 
their own labour to compensate for costs not included in the bid price.  173 
“I also think I probably would have missed out on BushBids if I’d costed in my 174 
time.” (Landholder 13) 175 
“Because we were already … personally committed to wanting to continue to do 176 
that sort of work but some assistance would be fantastic.” (Landholder 7) 177 
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“We kind of thought, well, if we make the bid too high then we won’t get it. So, we 178 
kind of compromised a bit and thought well we’re going to be doing work anyway 179 
… so we’re willing to volunteer our time on our own property anyway.” 180 
(Landholder 5) 181 
 182 
Table 1 Actual cost of management compared to cost included in the bid price (n=17) 183 
 Less than 
bid 
Close to bid More than 
bid 





Materials 3 7 4 2 1 
Hired labour 4 2 5 4 2 
Own labour 1 4 12a 0 0 
a Own time spent was reported to be 10-400% more than included in bid 184 
 185 
Perceived effectiveness was dependent on action type and was best for weed control. 186 
Grazing pressure from livestock was universally agreed to be about the same or lower during 187 
the contract period than immediately prior to the contract period (Table 2). Where livestock 188 
grazing pressure was perceived as similar, this was because these sites had already been 189 
destocked or were under a conservation grazing regime prior to contract establishment. 190 
Grazing pressure from rabbits during the contract period was sometimes seen as lower than 191 
the time before contracts, but was often reported as similar (Table 2). The landholder’s 192 
control efforts, biological control agents and the management actions of others in the 193 
landscape were factors considered to influence rabbit grazing pressure. Many participants 194 
reported an increase in grazing pressure from kangaroos during the contract period (Table 2), 195 
and 11 of the 21 participants were concerned about the current level of kangaroo grazing 196 
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pressure. Climate or weather conditions and land management in the surrounding landscape 197 
were key factors thought to be influencing grazing pressure from kangaroos. Participants 198 
reported a reduction in the cover of most weed species at the end of the contract period 199 
(Table 3), and largely attributed these changes to their management actions. 200 
 201 
Table 2 Perceived grazing pressure during contract period compared to before contract 202 
(n=21, respondents without contracts shown in parentheses) 203 
Source Higher About the 
same 
Lower Unsure Total 
Livestock 0 13 (3) 3 (1) 1 17 (4) 
Rabbits 2 7 (2) 5 (1) 3 (1) 17 (4) 
Kangaroos 8 (3) 7 (1) 0 2 17 (4) 
 204 
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Table 3 Perceived weed cover at the end of contract period compared to start of the contract 205 
period (n=21, respondents without contracts shown in parentheses) 206 
Weed species More About 
the 
same 
Less Unsure Total 
African Daisy Senecio pterophorus 0 2 2 (1) 0 4 (1) 
Blackberry Rubus species 0 1 3 0 4 
Boxthorn Lycium ferocissimum 0 1 4 0 5 
Bridal Creeper Asparagus asparagoides 1 (1) 1 6 0 8 (1) 
Cottonbush Gomphocarpus cancellatus 0 1 6 0 7 
Gorse Ulex europaeus (1) 0 3 (1) 0 3 (2) 
Horehound Marrubium vulgare 0 1 6 (1) 7 (1) 
Monadenia Disa bracteata  1 (1) 0 4 1(1) 6 (2) 
Olive Olea europaea 0 2 6 (1) 0 8 (1) 
Perennial Veldt Grass Ehrharta 
calycina 
0 1 2 2 5 
Pussy-tail Grass Pentameris pallida 0 1 1 2 4 
 207 
Participant’s motivations were sustained by enjoyment of the environment, achievement 208 
of their aims, interest and support provided by the program and a sense of 209 
accountability under the contracts.  210 
Some participants described their native vegetation with pride and enthusiasm and exhibited a 211 
sense of satisfaction in their achievements. 212 
“It's all looking good. You should come up and see it actually, this time of the 213 
year… the hills are like alpine hillsides.” (Landholder 3) 214 
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“Whenever we saw something, I could say, wow, that's such and such a reptile 215 
…” (Landholder 15) 216 
“There’s less, you know, gorse everywhere and you’re getting rid of the olive 217 
trees and things as well, so it sort of makes it feel more, you know, friendly. …You 218 
just feel you can go places that you … didn’t have access to before…. It’s quite 219 
rewarding, I think, to see the weeds and things going.” (Landholder 17) 220 
Engagement in the program offered a sense of public or community support and interest for 221 
participants’ conservation efforts. Additionally, the management plan’s priorities and targets 222 
played a role in motivating some participants. Likewise having contractual obligations was 223 
reported as a positive motivation.  224 
“I think knowing somebody's interested is very important… probably I spent more 225 
hours in there than I might have, or let's say more hours working rather than 226 
sitting and enjoying than I would have if I hadn't had BushBids.” (Landholder 6) 227 
“I said I’d do this work anyway. But you know, I don’t know whether that’s 228 
entirely true. I might not have been quite as diligent about it, I don’t think. I think 229 
it made me more diligent about reaching targets…. Yeah, you do feel like there’s 230 
someone kind of looking at what you’re doing a little bit, and I see that in a 231 
positive way, I don’t see it as a negative at all.” (Landholder 13) 232 
“…feeling, the obligation, the obligation to spend more time on biodiversity 233 
threatening processes.” (Landholder 8.1) 234 
“having...the management plan and knowing that we’ve got a contract there, it 235 
gives us some focus.” (Landholder 12) 236 
 237 
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Weeding was habitual for some participants  238 
Several participants reported that weed control was habitual as illustrated by the following 239 
quotations. 240 
“…you do it all the time, you know, whenever you see something…” (Landholder 241 
17) 242 
“So I guess it's sort of given me a more regular approach to weed control. Yeah, 243 
just that consistency and in going in at the same time each year… you don't forget 244 
about that.” (Landholder 15) 245 
“Probably at least every second day I’m over there taking the dog for a wander 246 
and you end up pulling the weeds.” (Landholder 13) 247 
 248 
Some participants wanted more opportunities for conservation related social connection 249 
Some participants asked for opportunities to meet other participants, and for signs to identify 250 
participation in the program. 251 
“to keep our enthusiasm going and probably those of others it would be good to 252 
… get [program participants]…together to discuss things.” (Landholder 8.1) 253 
“I would quite happily, at the bottom of our driveway, put a sign up saying we 254 
have received ten years of funding from BushBids…. I put it on my list, but it's on 255 
a bit of a backburner, to paint up a sign.” (Landholder 3) 256 
 257 
Participants wanted to continue work post contract but costs remained a barrier for 258 
many 259 
All participants indicated that ongoing management was required over the next ten-year 260 
period to continue to protect and restore biodiversity. All landholders said they would 261 
continue with weed control, and most indicated they would manage livestock and control 262 
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rabbits (Table 4). Approximately half indicated they would undertake some management or 263 
control of kangaroos.  264 
 265 
Table 4 Management actions participants indicated they would adopt in the future (n=19, 266 
respondents without contracts shown in parentheses) 267 
Management action Number of participants 
Livestock management 15 (3) 
Rabbit control 13 (3) 
Kangaroo control or management 8 (2) 
Control other grazing animals (Deer and/or Hares) 3 
Weed control 15 (4) 
 268 
In a small number of cases (3 contracted participants), cost was no longer a barrier to 269 
implementing these conservation actions. More commonly, participants expressed their 270 
intention to implement some conservation management actions regardless of future 271 
payments, but indicated that future payments would enable additional or increased 272 
management. 273 
“I would cost in one day a fortnight to…include my labour time. What that would 274 
actually do is speed up the process, because I would say, ‘No, I’m not working in 275 
my business, I’m working on my land and I’m actually getting a bit of payment for 276 
it.’ …So that would increase the work that I would be able to do.” (Landholder 277 
13) 278 
“Without [future payments] we would still continue on with the rabbit control, 279 
monitoring kangaroo numbers and control them if needed, and definitely running 280 
reduced sheep numbers. But we’ll probably need to increase sheep numbers 281 
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above the levels that we were running with the BushBids program.” (Landholder 282 
14) 283 
“I’m really keen to keep on top of the weed management … if we had money 284 
coming from outside then I could afford to employ someone else when I’m no 285 
longer able to do it myself … I mean it’s a lot of walking up and down the hills 286 
with a spray pack on your back …having had this major illness I realised I’m not 287 
going to be able to do it forever.” (Landholder 8.2) 288 
 289 
Bid prices remained similar for lower cost bidders and decreased for higher cost 290 
bidders  291 
Most of the six bidders with the lowest previous bid price (per hectare per year) indicated 292 
they would seek similar amounts to their previous bid for management over the next ten years 293 
(Figure 1). Three of the five higher cost bidders decreased their price in their new bids. It 294 
should be noted however that new bids may not have included transaction costs and may 295 




Figure 1 Previous and new bid prices for contracted landholders. Previous bid prices for a 299 
ten-year period between 2006 and 2017, adjusted for inflation and shown as 2016 $ values. 300 
New bid prices for a ten-year period between 2016 and 2028.  301 
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4. Discussion 302 
Bid prices were lower than the actual cost of management for many successful bidders, which 303 
was due, at least in part, to competition and cost uncertainty. This is consistent with findings 304 
from economic choice experiments where “fear of missing out” was dominant in auctions 305 
with both downward pressure on price (competition) and upward pressure on price (cost 306 
uncertainty) (Wichmann et al. 2016). Most participants coped with the shortfall between the 307 
actual cost of management and the bid price by contributing more of their own time than 308 
costed in their bid. Even where the difference between bid price and actual cost was 309 
unexpected, participants continued with their contracts. In these cases private benefits may 310 
have been underestimated at the time of bidding or the private benefits from staying in the 311 
contract may have increased during participation. 312 
We found evidence of the four social factors that, along with resources, Dayer et al. (2018) 313 
proposed as pathways to persistence: cognitions, sustaining motivations, habit forming and 314 
social norms. In relation to cognitions, all landholders perceived at least some of their 315 
management actions as successful, with control of most weed species and livestock 316 
management most likely to be reported as effective. However, difficulties were reported in 317 
relation to managing grazing pressure from rabbits and kangaroos and controlling some weed 318 
species (data not shown). These challenges did not appear to impact retention or persistence 319 
at the contract or broad vegetation management level, although they may have influenced the 320 
specific actions implemented or intended for the future. We found evidence of a range of 321 
sustaining motivations including the sense of: accountability, others’ interest in their 322 
conservation efforts, enjoyment, satisfaction and achievement. At least some participants 323 
reported that weed control was habitual. Finally, we also found evidence of social norms 324 
supporting participation, with some participants looking for opportunities to connect with 325 
others and have their work acknowledged. These could be seen as non-financial private 326 
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benefits (Pannell 2008) for program participants that would contribute to offsetting the cost 327 
of management. 328 
At the conclusion of the ten-year contract period, participants believed that ongoing 329 
management was needed to continue to protect and restore biodiversity. This was expected 330 
given the likelihood of new and recurring weed invasion and continuing grazing pressure 331 
from feral and native animals in the study system (Yates and Hobbs 1997). Participants 332 
expressed a desire to continue conservation management, however most said they would not 333 
be able to continue to manage to the standard or extent they wished without further funding 334 
support. In general, bid prices estimated for the next ten years were similar to or lower than 335 
previous bids. Where bids decreased, this may be a result of higher upfront costs included in 336 
the original bid, with reduced management costs following the initial investment.  337 
Although we found evidence of social factors that support persistence and retention, financial 338 
resources were identified as the critical barrier to persistence. This is likely to be the case for 339 
similar incentive programs where the costs (management and opportunity) of meeting 340 
conservation objectives are ongoing and outweigh the landholder’s private benefits from 341 
participation. In programs where there are initial adoption barriers, but land use or 342 
management change has a net private benefit, ongoing financial resources are not likely to be 343 
critical for persistence. Researchers, policy makers and practitioners should therefore exercise 344 
caution when making assumptions about post contract persistence. To avoid misleading 345 
associations with the term “incentive”, it may be beneficial to use the term “payments for 346 
ecosystem services” (PES) (Engel et al. 2008) in cases where implementation costs are 347 
expected to be ongoing. Finally, where post-contract persistence cannot be expected due to 348 
ongoing costs, continuing investment may be required in order to maintain and extend 349 
conservation gains.  350 
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1. The BushBids sites 
 
1.1. First I would like to ask you about your BushBids sites during the period since the BushBids 
contact began (or since you took over the contract and property from the previous owner). Could 




2.1. What difference, if any, has participation in BushBids made to you? 
 
3. Bid price 
 
3.1. Next I would like to ask you about how your bid price compared with the actual cost of 
management. I will ask you about materials, hired help and your time separately. 
 
3.1.1. Was the actual cost of materials: 
 less than 
priced in your bid 
 close to the 
price in your bid 
more than priced 
in your bid 
not included in 
your bid 




If different, please tell me why there was a difference?.......................................................................... 
 
 deliberate  estimation error other reason…………………….. 
 
Prompt for more information on why deliberately different or estimation error if necessary 
 
3.1.2. Was the actual cost of hired help: 
 less than 
priced in your bid 
 close to the 
price in your bid 
more than priced 
in your bid 
not included in 
your bid 




If different, please tell me why there was a difference?.......................................................................... 
 
 deliberate  estimation error other reason…………………….. 
 
Prompt for more information on why deliberately different or estimation error if necessary 
 
3.1.3. Was the actual amount of your time: 
 less than 
priced in your bid 
 close to the 
price in your bid 
more than priced 
in your bid 
not included in 
your bid 




If different, please tell me why there was a difference?.......................................................................... 
 
 deliberate  estimation error other reason…………………….. 
 
Prompt for more information on why deliberately different or estimation error if necessary 
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4. Grazing pressure management 
 
Now I would like to ask you about the grazing pressure at your BushBids sites during the BushBids 
contract, compared with the time before BushBids. I will ask you to consider grazing pressure from stock, 
rabbits and kangaroos separately, and then invite you to tell me about grazing pressure from any other 
animals. 
 
4.1. How would you rate the grazing pressure from stock at your sites during the BushBids contract 
compared with the time before BushBids?  Was the stock grazing pressure:  
 
 higher than the time 
before BushBids 
 about the same as the 
time before BushBids 




4.1.1. How much of the change was due to your management actions: 
none some about half most all 
 
4.1.2. What other factors contributed to this change if any? 
 
4.1.3. How did these factors contribute to the change? 
 
4.2. How would you rate the grazing pressure from rabbits at your sites during the BushBids 
contract compared with the time before BushBids?  Was the rabbit grazing pressure:  
 
4.2.1. How much of the change was due to your management actions: 
none some about half most all 
 
4.2.2. What other factors contributed to this change if any? 
 
4.2.3. How did these factors contribute to the change? 
 
4.3. How would you rate the grazing pressure from kangaroos at your sites during the BushBids 
contract compared with the time before BushBids?  Was the kangaroo grazing pressure:  
 
 higher than the time 
before BushBids 
 about the same as the 
time before BushBids 




4.3.1. How much of the change was due to your management actions: 
none some about half most all 
 
4.3.2. What other factors contributed to this change if any? 
 
4.3.3. How did these factors contribute to the change? 
 
4.4. Are there any other animals contributing to grazing pressure on your property that you would 
like to mention? 
 
4.5. How would you rate the grazing pressure from [other animal] at your sites during the BushBids 
contract compared with the time before BushBids?  Was the [other animal] grazing pressure:  
 
 higher than the time 
before BushBids 
 about the same as the 
time before BushBids 




 higher than the time 
before BushBids 
 about the same as the 
time before BushBids 




4.5.1. How much of the change was due to your management actions: 
none some about half most all 
 
4.5.2. What other factors contributed to this change if any? 
 
4.5.3. How did these factors contribute to the change? 
 
4.6. In your opinion, which actions will be required to manage grazing pressure at your BushBids 
sites over the next ten years after your BushBids contract is completed? [read list of 
management actions] 
 
 Exclude stock 
 Conservation grazing (stock grazing with restrictions designed to promote native species)  
 Control rabbits 






4.7. Which of those actions would you take, if you didn’t have a contract and funding? Again, please 
consider the period of ten years immediately after your current BushBids contract is completed 
[read list of management actions] 
 
 Exclude stock 
 Conservation grazing (stock grazing with restrictions designed to promote native species)  
 Control rabbits 






4.8. Which actions would your take if you did have a contract with funding? Again, please consider 
the period of ten years immediately after your current BushBids contract is completed [read list 
of management actions] 
 
 Exclude stock 
 Conservation grazing (stock grazing with restrictions designed to promote native species)  
 Control rabbits 





5. Weed management 
 
5.1. Now I would like to ask you about the current weed cover at your BushBids sites compared with 
the time before BushBids.   I will ask you to consider five weeds identified for control in your 
BushBids management plan [list five weeds from management plan] 
 
5.1.1. How would you rate the cover of [XX weed] at your BushBids sites in the last year 
compared with the time before BushBids?  In the last year, did the weed have:  
 more cover  about the same cover less cover unsure 
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5.1.1.1. How much of the change was due to your management actions: 
none some about half most all 
 
5.1.1.2. What other factors contributed to this change if any? 
 
5.1.1.3. How did these factors contribute to the change? 
 
5.1.2. How would you rate the cover of [XX weed] at your BushBids sites in the last year 
compared with the time before BushBids?  In the last year, did the weed have:  
 more cover  about the same cover less cover unsure 
5.1.2.1. How much of the change was due to your management actions: 
none some about half most all 
 
5.1.2.2. What other factors contributed to this change if any? 
 
5.1.2.3. How did these factors contribute to the change? 
 
5.1.3. How would you rate the cover of [XX weed] at your BushBids sites in the last year 
compared with the time before BushBids?  In the last year, did the weed have:  
 more cover  about the same cover less cover unsure 
5.1.3.1. How much of the change was due to your management actions: 
none some about half most all 
 
5.1.3.2. What other factors contributed to this change if any? 
 
5.1.3.3. How did these factors contribute to the change? 
 
5.1.4. How would you rate the cover of [XX weed] at your BushBids sites in the last year 
compared with the time before BushBids?  In the last year, did the weed have:  
 more cover  about the same cover less cover unsure 
5.1.4.1. How much of the change was due to your management actions: 
none some about half most all 
 
5.1.4.2. What other factors contributed to this change if any? 
 
5.1.4.3. How did these factors contribute to the change? 
 
5.1.5. How would you rate the cover of [XX weed] at your BushBids sites in the last year 
compared with the time before BushBids?  In the last year, did the weed have:  
 more cover  about the same cover less cover unsure 
5.1.5.1. How much of the change was due to your management actions: 
none some about half most all 
 
5.1.5.2. What other factors contributed to this change if any? 
 
5.1.5.3. How did these factors contribute to the change? 
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5.2. In your opinion, what are the five most important weeds to manage over the next ten years after 







5.3. Which of those weeds would you manage, if you didn’t have a contract and funding? Again, 








5.4. Which of those weeds would you manage, if you did have a contract and funding? Again, please 







6. Other management actions 
 
6.1. Are there any other actions you would like to take to manage your sites in the future? 
 
7. Further comments 
 
7.1. Do you have any further comments? 
 
8. Land manager and property details 
 
8.1. What is your total property size? 
 
8.2. What proportion of your property is native vegetation? 
 
8.3. Approximately what percentage of your household income is derived from your property? 
 
8.4. How long have you had your property? 
 
8.5. Who is the primary decision maker for native vegetation on your property?               
[Ask for gender if not clear from answer] 
 
8.6. What is your age? 
 
8.7. Do you or any of your family members belong to a community, professional or environmental 
group(s)?  
 
 Community group(s) Please list: 
 Professional group(s) Please list: 
 Environmental group(s) Please list: 




1. The bushland 
 
1.1. First I would to ask you about your bushland on your property over the last 9 or 10 years since 
you expressed interest in BushBids. Could you please tell me about any changes you have 
noticed in your bushland during that time? 
 
2. Grazing pressure management 
 
2.1. Did you take any actions to manage grazing pressure in your bushland since receiving the 
BushBids site assessment and management plan?  [If yes please list] 
 
 
2.2. Did you receive funding or support from another source to help with these management actions? 
 
 yes  no 
 






   Heritage Agreement Grant Scheme 
   Local Action Planning Group 
   NRM Board 
   Trees For Life 
   Greening Australia 
   Other………………………. 
   Other………………………. 
 
 
Now I would like to ask you about the grazing pressure in your bushland during the time since the 
BushBids site visit, compared with the time before that.   I will ask you to consider grazing pressure from 
stock, rabbits and kangaroos separately, and then invite you to tell me about grazing pressure from any 
other animals. 
 
2.3. How would you rate the grazing pressure from stock in your bushland since the BushBids site 
visit compared with the time before that?  Was the stock grazing pressure:  
 
 higher than the time 
before BushBids 
 about the same as the 
time before BushBids 




2.3.1. How much of the change was due to your management actions: 
none some about half most all 
 
2.3.2. What other factors contributed to this change if any? 
 
2.3.3. How did these factors contribute to the change? 
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2.4. How would you rate the grazing pressure from rabbits in your bushland since the BushBids site 
visit compared with the time before that?  Was the rabbit grazing pressure:  
 
 higher than the time 
before BushBids 
 about the same as the 
time before BushBids 




2.4.1. How much of the change was due to your management actions: 
none some about half most all 
 
2.4.2. What other factors contributed to this change if any? 
 
2.4.3. How did these factors contribute to the change? 
 
2.5. How would you rate the grazing pressure from kangaroos in your bushland since the BushBids 
site visit compared with the time before that?  Was the kangaroo grazing pressure:  
 
 higher than the time 
before BushBids 
 about the same as the 
time before BushBids 




2.5.1. How much of the change was due to your management actions: 
none some about half most all 
 
2.5.2. What other factors contributed to this change if any? 
 
2.5.3. How did these factors contribute to the change? 
 
2.6. Are there any other animals contributing to grazing pressure on your property that you would 
like to mention? 
 
2.7. How would you rate the grazing pressure from [other animal] in your bushland during the 
BushBids contract compared with the time before BushBids?  Was the [other animal] grazing 
pressure:  
 
 higher than the time 
before BushBids 
 about the same as the 
time before BushBids 




2.7.1. How much of the change was due to your management actions: 
none some about half most all 
 
2.7.2. What other factors contributed to this change if any? 
 




2.8. In your opinion, which actions will be required to manage grazing pressure in your bushland 
sites over the next ten years? [read list of management actions] 
 
 Exclude stock 
 Conservation grazing (stock grazing with restrictions designed to promote native species)  
 Control rabbits 





2.9. Which actions would your take over the next ten years if you didn’t have a contract with 
funding? [read list of management actions] 
 
 Exclude stock 
 Conservation grazing (stock grazing with restrictions designed to promote native species)  
 Control rabbits 





2.10. Which actions would your take over the next ten years if you did have a contract with 
funding? [read list of management actions] 
 
 Exclude stock 
 Conservation grazing (stock grazing with restrictions designed to promote native species)  
 Control rabbits 





3. Weed management 
 
3.1. Did you take any actions to manage weeds in your bushland since receiving the BushBids site 
assessment and management plan?  
 
3.2. Did you receive funding or support from another source to help with these management actions? 
 yes  no 
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   Heritage Agreement Grant Scheme 
   Local Action Planning Group 
   NRM Board 
   Trees For Life 
   Greening Australia 
   Other………………………. 
   Other………………………. 
 
3.3. Now I would like to ask you about the current weed cover in your bushland compared with the 
time before BushBids.   I will ask you to consider five weeds identified for control in your 
BushBids management plan [list five weeds from management plan] 
 
3.3.1. How would you rate the cover of [XX weed] in your bushland in the last year compared 
with the time before BushBids?  In the last year, did the weed have:  
 more cover  about the same cover less cover unsure 
 
3.3.1.1. How much of the change was due to your management actions: 
none some about half most all 
 
3.3.1.2. What other factors contributed to this change if any? 
 
3.3.1.3. How did these factors contribute to the change? 
 
3.3.2. How would you rate the cover of [XX weed] in your bushland in the last year compared 
with the time before BushBids?  In the last year, did the weed have:  
 more cover  about the same cover less cover unsure 
 
3.3.2.1. How much of the change was due to your management actions: 
none some about half most all 
 
3.3.2.2. What other factors contributed to this change if any? 
 
3.3.2.3. How did these factors contribute to the change? 
 
3.3.3. How would you rate the cover of [XX weed] in your bushland in the last year compared 
with the time before BushBids?  In the last year, did the weed have:  
 more cover  about the same cover less cover unsure 
 
3.3.3.1. How much of the change was due to your management actions: 
none some about half most all 
 
3.3.3.2. What other factors contributed to this change if any? 
 
3.3.3.3. How did these factors contribute to the change? 
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3.3.4. How would you rate the cover of [XX weed] in your bushland in the last year compared 
with the time before BushBids?  In the last year, did the weed have:  
 more cover  about the same cover less cover unsure 
 
3.3.4.1. How much of the change was due to your management actions: 
none some about half most all 
 
3.3.4.2. What other factors contributed to this change if any? 
 
3.3.4.3. How did these factors contribute to the change? 
 
3.3.5. How would you rate the cover of [XX weed] in your bushland in the last year compared 
with the time before BushBids?  In the last year, did the weed have:  
 more cover  about the same cover less cover unsure 
 
3.3.5.1. How much of the change was due to your management actions: 
none some about half most all 
 
3.3.5.2. What other factors contributed to this change if any? 
 
3.3.5.3. How did these factors contribute to the change? 
 
3.4. In your opinion, what are the five most important weeds to manage in your bushland over the 








3.5. Which of these weeds would you manage over the next ten years if you didn’t have a contract 















4. Other management actions 
 
4.1. Are there any other actions you would like to take to manage your bushland in the future? 
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5. Further comments 
 
5.1. Do you have any further comments? 
 
6. Land manager and property details 
 
6.1. What is your total property size? 
 
6.2. What proportion of your property is native vegetation? 
 
6.3. Approximately what percentage of your household income is derived from your property? 
 
6.4. How long have you had your property? 
 
6.5. Who is the primary decision maker for native vegetation on your property?               
[Ask for gender if not clear from answer] 
 
6.6. What is your age? 
 
6.7. Do you or any of your family members belong to a community, professional or environmental 
group(s)?  
 
 Community group(s) Please list: 
 Professional group(s) Please list: 
 Environmental group(s) Please list: 
 None  
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Appendix S2. Landholder demographic characteristics 
 
Primary decision makers for native vegetation were male (9), family groups (6), female (5), 
and a business (1). Participation in environmental, community and professional groups was 
high (95%). 
Table S2. Demographic characteristics of participants 
 Median Min Max 
Property size (ha) 43 7 >1500 
Per cent of property with native veg cover 75 17 100 
Per cent of household income derived from 
property 
0 0 100 
Year property acquired by landholder’s family 1992 2012* Pre-1970 
Age of landholder 60 37 82 






Appendix S3. Questionnaire 
 
In this follow up questionnaire we would like you to provide an estimated bid price for each of the 
three groups of management actions discussed in the interview.   
 
We do not expect you to go to a lot of trouble to source quotes to calculate your estimated bid price. 
Please just provide your best estimate of the price you would seek to implement the listed 
management actions over the next ten years. 
 
It is important that your estimated bid prices are relevant to the same area and sites as originally 
included in your BushBids management plan.  For your reference, the total area is XXX ha and the 
sites are identified in the attached map/s.  
 
1. These are the actions you indicated would be required over the next ten years to manage grazing 
pressure in your BushBids sites. 
 
 List of actions 
 
1.1. If you could bid in a program like BushBids to undertake the actions listed above to manage 






2. These are the weeds you indicated are priorities to manage over the next ten years at your 
BushBids sites. 
 
 List of weeds 
 
2.1. If you could bid in a program like BushBids to manage these weeds in your BushBids sites 






3. These are the other management actions you indicated you would take to manage your 
BushBids sites over the next ten years.   
 
 List of actions 
 
3.1. If you could bid in a program like BushBids to take these management actions over the next 










Chapter 6. Conclusion 
The research presented in this thesis provides policy relevant insights for biodiversity 
conservation on private land. It shows that 10-year, revealed-price incentive contracts for 
restoration of remnant native vegetation can produce biodiversity gains compared with the 
business as usual scenario of native vegetation management on private land (Chapter 3, see 
Figure 4 (ii) below). Following on from this, Chapter 4 shows that carbon markets could pay 
the cost of that restoration, offering the opportunity to increase the extent of restoration 
within constrained budgets and provide demonstrated biodiversity benefits from 
investment in carbon emissions reduction (Figure 4 (iii)). Furthermore, the research offers 
new insights about the landholders who participate in conservation incentive programs. The 
assumption that landholders are generally farming individuals and families is challenged in 
Chapter 1, which highlights the role of absentee and group landholders (Figure 4 (i)). 
Chapter 5, shows that participants use their own time (at no cost) to increase the 
competitiveness of their bids and compensate for unexpected shortfalls between bid price 
and the actual cost of management (Figure 4 (iv)). It also qualifies Dayer et al. (2018)’s 
theory of persistence by demonstrating that post-contract continuation of conservation 
behaviour depends on continuing incentive payments when private costs exceed private 
benefits. Taken together these findings advance our understanding of what it takes to 
produce a biodiversity gain through restoration of remnant vegetation, how to increase the 
impact of available resources for biodiversity conservation and how to support and engage 




Figure 4 Conceptual diagram for conservation incentive programs where incentive 
payments are used to purchase environmental services from private landholders. Findings 
presented in this thesis include; study (i) absentee and group landholders contribute to the 
range of landholder types participating in conservation incentives; study (ii) incentive 
contracts can produce biodiversity gains compared to the business as usual scenario; study 
(iii) carbon markets can pay for restoration, study (iv) participants use their own time to 
compensate for uncertainty in management costs and where management costs are 
ongoing, participants are unlikely to persist with their desired standard and extent of 
management if incentive payments cease.  
The key finding that incentive contracts produced a biodiversity gain was made possible by 
the use of a Before-After-Control-Impact (BACI) monitoring design. Although acknowledged 
as good practice, BACI designs have rarely been used in conservation incentive impact 
evaluation (Ferraro, 2009; Kleijn and Sutherland, 2003). However, see Bright et al. (2015) for 
example. The BACI design facilitated the detection of incentive contract impacts on native 
vegetation relative to the influence of external factors such as climate and weather. It also 
provided a step toward understanding background trajectories in vegetation condition, 
information which is needed for native vegetation policies but is often missing (e.g. Maron 










































Evidence of biodiversity gain from conservation incentive payments presented here 
provides support for continued use of these programs. Furthermore, when linked with the 
incentive price, or cost of achieving the biodiversity gain, this information has the potential 
to greatly assist in prioritisation and allocation of conservation investment. It may also assist 
in accounting for and valuing biodiversity in markets for carbon and other ecosystem 
services, as suggested in Chapter 4, for example. Finally this unique dataset provides critical, 
previously lacking information for native vegetation offset policies where predicted 
biodiversity gains are used to calculate the size of the restoration area needed to offset 
losses from vegetation clearance (Maron et al., 2016). The dataset will enable the 
evaluation of offset policies currently in use, as well as supporting considerably improved 
accuracy in the calculation of offset ratios. 
Policy design must address the needs of target participants including emerging and 
previously unrecognised participant types such as absentee and group landholders 
identified in study (i). Future participation may be influenced by changing land ownership 
linked to climate change, as well as the evolution of landholder attitudes, behaviours and 
social norms (Riley, 2016). Increasing program budgets (e.g. through linking biodiversity with 
carbon markets as examined in Study (iii)) may also make incentive payments accessible to 
landholders who have lower net private benefits from participation (Study (iv)). 
Consideration should also be given to post-contract support for participants, such as the 
opportunity for new or renewed incentive contracts, because persistence without incentives 
is unlikely when private costs exceed private benefits and ongoing management is required 
(Study (iv)). 
There are many factors that may influence restoration costs in the future. In addition to 
market prices for materials, services and labour, participant’s private benefits and risk can 
also influence bid price (Pannell, 2008; Whitten et al., 2013; Wichmann et al., 2016). The 
program studied here is likely to have engaged a high proportion of the low-cost bidders in 
the landscape, so additional bidders from the same landscape may seek higher prices. 
Furthermore, where ongoing management is required to maintain or restore biodiversity as 
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shown in Studies (ii) and (iv), bid prices are unlikely to be substantially reduced for 
subsequent contracts (Study (iv)). 
A number of potential directions for future research have been identified throughout this 
thesis. They are presented together here as a guide to future work. 
 Given absentee landholders were identified as important incentive program 
participants, further research is needed to improve knowledge of absentee land 
ownership patterns, and the drivers and constraints to their participation in 
incentive programs.  
 As is the case for absentee landholders, further research is needed regarding group 
land ownership, the identification of group types and the drivers and constraints to 
incentive program participation. 
 Given that the measured impacts of intervention were modest compared with 
background changes, and that others have identified the importance of climate and 
weather on environmental outcomes (e.g. Vaughn and Young, 2010), further 
medium and long-term studies on the ecological impact of conservation incentives 
are needed. 
 To improve the sensitivity in future outcome evaluations for remnant native 
vegetation restoration, sampling strategies could be refined or modified. This could 
include increasing sample size, modifying within-site sampling strategies and 
modifying response variable measures. However, modifications to sampling 
strategies should be evaluated for cost effectiveness and practicality of 
implementation in conservation incentive programs. 
 Evidence of biodiversity gains from this research (10-year, BACI designed study) will, 
for the first time, enable the calculation of Australian native vegetation offset ratios 
based on empirical evidence.  
 As this research shows that carbon markets can pay for 10-year restoration contracts 
under plausible scenarios, further research is needed to explore the relationship 






 Further refinement and calibration of the FullCAM carbon accounting model is 
needed to support the accounting of carbon sequestered by remnant vegetation 
restoration. 
 Further empirical research is needed relating to the role of costs in participant 
retention and post-contract behavioural persistence, particularly relating to 
participant learning and the implications of aging landholder demographics. 
In summary, the research presented in this thesis provides support for continued use of 
incentive payments for private land conservation, and highlights the opportunity to increase 
the extent of restoration by harnessing carbon markets. It contributes critical information 
for biodiversity conservation investment and offsets polices and provides insights to refine 
engagement with landholders through incentive programs. These findings offer multiple 
approaches to increase or improve conservation efforts and contribute to halting 
biodiversity loss.  
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THIS DEED made as of the
PARTIES
day of 2015
TllE UNIVERSIW OF ADEIAIDE {ABN 61 249 878 937), a body corporate established pursuant to
the provisions of the Un¡versity of Adeloide Act 7977 (SA) and having its principal office at North
Terrace, Adelaide, South Australia, 5O00 (the Rec¡p¡entl.
Cf CONNOR NRM {ABN 61 114 O28 5721of 20 Adelaide St, Maylands SA, (the Discloser).
RECITATS
The Recipíent, through ¡ts School of Agriclture, Food and Wine, has arranged for its student
Anthelia Bond {the Student) to conduct a Higher Degree by Research project in relation to the
influence of market based incentives on land manager behaviour and ecosystem servlce
provisíon in agricultural landscapes {the ProFa}. The Project shall be supervised by Timothy
Cavagnaro, an employeeof the Recipient (each a Supervisor).
The Recipient wishes to have access for the Agreed Purpose (as defined below) to certain
information held by the Discloser. The Recipient has agreed to enter into this Deed in relation to
the protection by the Recipient of the confident¡ality of the information to be disclosed by the




Affiliate means, in respect of a party, a corporation that is related to that party under
section 228 of the Corporations Act 2001 lCthl.
Agreed Purpose means the sole and exclusive purpose for which the lnformat¡on has
been supplied by the Discloser to the Recipient, being the conduct by Student of the
Project ând the prepâration, review and assessment ofStudent's Thesis on that Project.
lnformation means any information designated as confidential or which by its nature is
confidential or which is disclosed ¡n circumstances import¡ng an obligation of
confidence, which ls disclosed or made available directly or indirectly by or on behalf of








or aftÊr the date of this Deed, which may include pre-existing biophysical and social data
generated by the Eastern Mt Lofty Ranges BushBids project.
Person means an individual or e corporate body, partnership or other legal entity.
Thesis means any work, or subject mãtter other than a work, prepared by the Student
and submitted as part of the requirernents for examination for the award of a degree at
the University.
A reference to the Discloser includes a reference to its Affiliates.
Confidentiality
The Recipient must treat the lnformation as proprietary and confidential and must not
disclose the lnfornation to any third party except for the Agreed Purpose.
The Recipienfs obligations under clauses 2, 3 and 4,3 of this Deed do not apply to âny
lnformation which:
(a) is ¡n the public domain at the time of disclosure, or becomes part of the public
domain after disclosure, otherw¡se than through a breach of this Agreement
(but compilations of information which are not public shall not be treated as
being public by reason of them containing information which is);
(b) the Recipient can prove was ¡n its lawful possession pr¡or to disclosure to it by
the Discloser and which was not acquired directly of indirectly from the
Discloser under an obligation of confidentiality;
(c) is lawfully and bona fide obta¡ned by the Recipient from a third Person who, to
the knowledge and reasonable belief of the Rec¡pient, did not receive the
lnformation directly or indirectly from the Discloser under an obligation of
confidentiality; or
{d} is required to be disclosed by law or applicable legal process {subject to the
Recipient claiming any immunity, privilege or restriction, on and from
disclosure, that it can reasonably claim and always provided that the Rec¡p¡ent
will immediately notify the Discloser of any such request, where possible before,
or as soon as practicable after, rnaking the disclosure).
The Recipient must keep the lnformation in safe custody at âll times and not use or copy
the lnformation or reduce ¡t into tang¡ble or recorded form other than for the Agreed
Purpose.
The Recipient will promptly notify the Discloser ¡n writing upon the completion of use of
the lnformation for the Agreed Purpose.
The Rec¡p¡ent must inform the Discloser immediately if it becomes ãware or suspects
that there has been a breach of the obligations in this Deed or an unauthorised use or
















The Recip¡ent will limit access to the lnformat¡on to:
(al those staff and students of the School of Agriculture Food and Wine (which will
include the Student and the Supervisor(s)); and
(b) to Affiliates, consultants, professionat advisers, egents or associates ofthe
Recipient,
who reasonably require access to the lnformation in relation to the Project.
Each Person to whom lnformation is disclosed will be advised by the Recipient of the
confìdential nature of the lnformät¡on and will be obliged to treat the tnformation as
strictly confídential in the same manner as the Recip¡ent under this Deed.
The Recipient will be liable to the Discloser for any ãct or omission of the Student or any
other Person to whom it discloses the lnformation as if those act¡ons or omissions were
the Recipient's own.
Use of the Information
The Recipient acknowledges thet it is mek¡ng independent use of the lnformation and
will verifu all information upon which it intends to rely to its own satisfaction and that
the Discloser does not make any representâtion or warranty, express or implied as to
the quality, accuracy or completeness of the lnformation and does not accept any
responsibility for;
(a) any errors or om¡ss¡ons in the lnformation; or
{b} any interpretation, opinion or conclusion that the Recipient may form as a result
of examining the lnformation.
Except to the enent that exclusion of liability is not permitted by law, the D¡scloser ¡s
not liable {whether on the bâs¡s of negligence or otherwise) and does not accept any
responsibility for any loss or damage that the Recipient or anyone else may suffer or
incur as a result of using, relying on or disclosing any of the lnformation.
The Recipient shall not publish the lnformation or any conclusions that could only have
been drawn using the lnformation without the pr¡or written consent of the Discloser and
on such conditions as the Discloser may wish to impose. The Discloser agrees that
approval to publish the lnforrnation and conclusions shall not be unreasonably withheld.
Nothing in this Deed shall prevent the Student or the Recip¡ent from providing the
Thesis to the Recipient's examiners (Examiners) for assessment. ln recognit¡on of the
confidentiality of the Information, the Recipient will provide a copy of the Thesis to the
Discloser pr¡or to submission to the Ëxaminers for assessment.
At the request of ttre Discloser by notice to the Recipient not less than 30 days prior to
submission of the Thesis:
(a) the Thesis will be submitted to the Examiners in confidence; and
(b) the Rec¡pient will ensure that the Thesis is kept confidential for a period of no
more than 12 months from the submission of the Thesis.






The Discloser acknowledges that the Student retains ownershlp of all copyright in the
Thesis.
Property, Retum and Destruction of lnforrnation
lnformation thät ¡s the property of the Discloser shall rema¡n its property and no other
rights otherthan those expressly granted by this Deed are conferred upon the Recípient.
The Discloser may demand the return or destruction of all lnformation, at any tlme upon
giving wr¡tten notice to the Recip¡ent. Subject to clause 5.2, but otherwise irrespective
of any other provision in thís Deed, the Student must cease to use lnformation or any
part of it for any purpose upon receipt of a demand for its return or destruction under
this clause 5.1.
Within 20 days of receipt of a notice under clause 5.1, the Recipient will return or
destroy all of the original lnformation and destroy all copies and reproductions (whether
written, electronic or otherwlse) in its possession and in the possession of the Student
and any other Persons to whom it was disclosed. lf required by the Discloser, the
Recipient will certify on oåth that it has complied with this clause 5.2. Required hard
copy and digital versions of the final Thesis are exempt from being returned or '' ,' , .
destroyed.
Term
This Oeed shall remain in effect until the expiry of two years from the date of
acceptânce ofthe Thesis by the Recipient.
Notiæs
All notices under this Deed shall be in writing and sent to the address of each party as
set out below or any other address that is subsequently notif¡ed:
The Recipient
Dean of the Waite
School of Agriculture Food and Wine
School Building, Weate Campus, Urrbrae





PO Box 255 Stepney, SA, 5069
Phone: 08 7324 4161
Miscellaneous









8^1 This is the entire agreement between the parties about its subject matter and replaces
all oral and written príor communications and agreements between the part¡es.
8.2 South Australian law applies to th¡s Deed and proceedings must be commenced in the
courts of South Australia or the Adelaide Registry of the Federâl Court of Australía.
8.3 A waiver by a party in respect of a breach of a provision of this Deed must not be taken
to be a waiver unless given in writing and will not constitute a waiver of any other
breach. The failure by a party at any t¡me to enforce a provision of th¡s Deed must not
be construed as å waiver by that party of that prov¡s¡on or in any way affect the validity
of this Deed or any part of it.
8.4 The Recipient recognises and agrees that monetary damages alone may not be
adeguate compensation to the Discloser for a breach by the Recipient or any Person to
whom the lnformation is disclosed and the Discloser shall be entitled to both legal and
equitable remedies, including injunct¡ons and specific performancd, in the event of any
breach of this Deed.
8.5 This Deed may only be varied by the parties in writing,
8.5 This Deed may be signed electronically and in counterparts.
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EXECUTED AS A DEED
Signed, sealed and delivered for and on behalf of
The University of Adelaide
by its authorised representative:
Signature of authorised representetive
Dare: #-5/t'f t#
Signed, sealed and delivered for and on behalf of
(/ConnorNRM : .
by its authorised representative:
Patrick O'Connor
Name of authorised representative
FrolessÖl Mike BrcÔks
-iilï;,Tl?ãiä?i$ååHååì!-
Patrick D¡gitally signed by PatrickO'Connor
o'Connor ?îii;äî;iliJ
Signature of authorised representative
g,¿1p-' 27111115
l, Anthelia Bond, acknowledge the terms of this Deed and agree to comply with its terms in so
far as they apply to me,
Signature of Student
ii
Date: i l¡¿ /zo I $
l, Timothy Cavagnaro, acknowledge the terms of this Deed.
oate: 
'{,1rz-f "a-or5
Name of authorised representative
Fsï-,'"+iüil1lþ.,ìi, #,¡¡ffi '..'















OFFICE OF RESEARCH ETHICS, COMPLIANCE 
AND INTEGRITY 
THE UNIVERSITY OF ADELAIDE 
 
LEVEL 4, RUNDLE MALL PLAZA   
50 RUNDLE MALL 
ADELAIDE SA  5000 AUSTRALIA 
 
TELEPHONE    +61 8 8313 5137 
FACSIMILE       +61 8 8313 3700 
EMAIL hrec@adelaide.edu.au 
 
CRICOS Provider Number 00123M 
 
14 March 2017 
 
Associate Professor O’Connor 
Global Food Studies 
 
Dear Associate Professor O’Connor  
 
ETHICS APPROVAL No: H-2016-103 
  
PROJECT TITLE: Managing native vegetation on private land—land manager experiences 
and perspectives on future management 
 
Thank you for the amendment request for the above project and the response to matters raised provided by PhD 
student Anthelia Bond on the 02.03.2017 and 10.03.2017, respectively. The requests to add Assistant Professor 
Sean Smukler as a researcher, temporarily store de-identified data at University of British Colombia, access 
additional de-identified data (from Eastern Mt Lofty Ranges BushBids project), extend scope of study aims, and 
add an additional aim associated with October 2016 amendment, as outlined in application documents provided 
on the 02.03.2017, have been reviewed and approved by the Low Risk Human Research Ethics Review Group 
(Faculty of Arts and Faculty of the Professions).  
 
The ethics expiry date for this project is 31 May 2019. 
 
Ethics approval is granted for three years and is subject to satisfactory annual reporting. The form titled Annual 
Report on Project Status is to be used when reporting annual progress and project completion and can be 
downloaded at http://www.adelaide.edu.au/research-services/oreci/human/reporting/. Prior to expiry, ethics 
approval may be extended for a further period. 
 
Participants in the study are to be given a copy of the Information Sheet and the signed Consent Form to retain. It 
is also a condition of approval that you immediately report anything which might warrant review of ethical 
approval including: 
 serious or unexpected adverse effects on participants, 
 previously unforeseen events which might affect continued ethical acceptability of the project, 
 proposed changes to the protocol; and 








   DR JOHN TIBBY                                                                       DR ANNA OLIJNK 
Co-Convenor Co-Convenor 
Low Risk Human Research Ethics Review Group 
(Faculty of Arts and Faculty of the Professions) 
Low Risk Human Research Ethics Review Group 
(Faculty of Arts and Faculty of the Professions) 
141
















Bushland condition monitoring site report EXAMPLE 
 
Vegetation association: Eucalyptus leucoxylon Open Woodland 




Image date 7/1/2007 
 
 
Image date 3/12/2015 
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1. Plant species 
 







Acacia paradoxa Kangaroo Thorn Native  yes yes  
Acacia pycnantha Golden Wattle Native  yes yes  
Aira sp. Hair-grass Weed   yes  
Allocasuarina verticillata Drooping Sheoak Native  yes yes  
Amphipogon caricinus var. caricinus Long Grey-beard Grass Native  yes yes  
Arthropodium fimbriatum Nodding Vanilla-lily Native   yes  
Arthropodium sp. Vanilla-lily Native  yes   
Arthropodium strictum Common Vanilla-lily Native   yes  
Astroloma humifusum Cranberry Heath Native  yes yes  
Austrodanthonia setacea Small-flower Wallaby-grass Native   yes  
Austrodanthonia sp.  Native  2 species   
Austrostipa semibarbata Fibrous Spear-grass Native   yes  
Austrostipa sp. Spear-grass Native  2 species   
Avena sp. Oat Weed   yes  
Billardiera cymosa.  Native  yes yes  
Bossiaea prostrata Creeping Bossiaea Native  yes   
Briza maxima Large Quaking-grass Weed  yes yes  
Brunonia australis Blue Pincushion Native   yes  
Burchardia umbellata Milkmaids Native  yes yes  
Bursaria spinosa Bursaria Native  yes yes  
Chamaescilla corymbosa var. 




Convolvulus angustissimus  Native   yes  
Convolvulus sp.  Native  yes   
Cynoglossum sp. Hound's-tongue Native   yes  
Deyeuxia quadriseta Reed Bent-grass Native   yes  
Dianella revoluta var. revoluta Black-anther Flax-lily Native  yes   
Dianella sp. Flax-lily Native   yes  
Ehrharta longiflora Annual Veldt Grass Weed   yes  
Eucalyptus fasciculosa Pink Gum Native Rare  yes  
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Eucalyptus leucoxylon South Australian Blue Gum Native  yes yes  
Exocarpos cupressiformis Native Cherry Native  yes yes  
Gonocarpus sp. Raspwort Native   yes  
Gramineae sp. Grass Family Weed  yes   
Grevillea lavandulacea ssp. 




Grevillea rosmarinifolia ssp. 




Hakea carinata Erect Hakea Native  yes yes  
Hedera helix ssp. helix Ivy Weed   yes  
Hibbertia crinita  Native   yes  
Hibbertia exutiacies Prickly Guinea-flower Native  yes yes  
Hibbertia sp. Guinea-flower Native  yes   
Kennedia prostrata Scarlet Runner Native   yes  
Lepidosperma curtisiae Little Sword-sedge Native   yes  
Lepidosperma semiteres Wire Rapier-sedge Native  yes yes  
Lepidosperma sp. Sword-sedge/Rapier-sedge Native  yes   
Lomandra densiflora Soft Tussock Mat-rush Native  yes yes  
Lomandra micrantha Small-flower Mat-rush Native  yes yes  
Lomandra sororia Sword Mat-rush Native  yes   
Microlaena stipoides var. stipoides Weeping Rice-grass Native   yes  
Olearia ramulosa Twiggy Daisy-bush Native  yes yes  
Pimelea humilis Low Riceflower Native  yes yes  
Poa sp. Winter Grass Weed  yes   
Pultenaea pedunculata Matted Bush-pea Native  yes yes  
Rhamnus alaternus Blowfly Bush Weed   yes  
Tetratheca pilosa ssp. pilosa Hairy Pink-bells Native  yes   
Thelymitra sp. Sun-orchid Native   yes  
Themeda triandra Kangaroo Grass Native   yes  
Thysanotus patersonii Twining Fringe-lily Native  yes yes  
Tricoryne elatior Yellow Rush-lily Native   yes  
Ulex europaeus Gorse Weed  yes yes  
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2. Regeneration of trees and woody shrubs 
 
Scientific name Common name Regenerating 2006-07 Regenerating 2015-16 
Acacia pycnantha Golden Wattle yes yes 
Allocasuarina verticillata Drooping Sheoak yes yes 
Bursaria spinosa Bursaria yes yes 
Eucalyptus fasciculosa Pink Gum  yes 
Eucalyptus leucoxylon  SA Blue Gum yes yes 




3. Diversity of plant life forms 
 
Life form Estimated cover 2006-07 Estimated cover 2015-16 
Tall Trees > 15m  6 
Medium Trees 5 - 15m 5 2 
Small Trees < 5m 1 1.5 
Tall Shrubs > 2m 30 10 
Medium Shrubs 0.5 - 2m 40 40 
Small Shrubs < 0.5m 30 30 
Herbs 0.5 1 
Mat Plants/Groundcovers 0.5 0.1 
Tall Grasses > 0.5m 1 1.5 
Low Grasses < 0.5m 5 10 
Low Tussocks < 0.5m 30 4 




4. Weed cover 
 




Avena sp. Oat  0.1 
Briza maxima Large Quaking-grass 0.5  
Ehrharta longiflora Annual Veldt Grass  0.1 
Gramineae sp. Grass Family 0.5  
Grevillea rosmarinifolia ssp. 
rosmarinifolia Rosemary Grevillea 0.5 0.4 
Poa sp. Meadow-grass/Tussock-grass 0.5  
Rhamnus alaternus Blowfly Bush  0.1 




5. Ground cover  
 
Ground cover component Estimated cover 2006-07 Estimated cover 2015-16 
Native Ground Cover 90 45 
Weed Ground Cover 2 1 
Leaf Litter 25 40 
Exposed Rock 0 0 
Moss, lichen etc 0.5 15 




6. Fallen logs and trees 
 







7. Grazing pressure 
 
































Tree species Distance 
(m) 











7/01/2007 1 Eucalyptus leucoxylon  6.00 340 66 70 6.00 no  
7/01/2007 2 Eucalyptus leucoxylon  6.80 40 63 60 6.80 no  
7/01/2007 3 Eucalyptus leucoxylon  6.00 35 34 100 6.00 no  
7/01/2007 4 Eucalyptus leucoxylon  7.00 80 75 40 7.00 no  
7/01/2007 5 Eucalyptus leucoxylon  14.20 195 86 60 14.20 yes  
7/01/2007 6 Eucalyptus leucoxylon  10.10 260 77 30 10.10 no  
7/01/2007 7 Eucalyptus leucoxylon  10.50 315 47 80 10.50 no  
7/01/2007 8 Eucalyptus leucoxylon  10.50 340 54 30 10.50 no  
7/01/2007 9 Eucalyptus leucoxylon  12.00 0 95 50 12.00 no  
7/01/2007 10 Eucalyptus leucoxylon  13.00 60 65 60 13.00 no  
3/12/2015 1 Eucalyptus leucoxylon  6.10 340 67 98 6.10 yes  
3/12/2015 2 Eucalyptus leucoxylon  6.50 47 69 70 6.50 yes  
3/12/2015 3 Eucalyptus leucoxylon  5.50 35 38 100 5.50 yes  
3/12/2015 4 Eucalyptus leucoxylon  7.10 81 89 25 7.10 yes  
3/12/2015 5 Eucalyptus leucoxylon  14.40 195 81 85 14.40 yes  
3/12/2015 6 Eucalyptus leucoxylon  10.30 255 109 50 10.30 yes  
3/12/2015 7 Eucalyptus leucoxylon  10.60 311 45 100 10.60 yes  
3/12/2015 8 Eucalyptus leucoxylon  10.70 339 56 40 10.70 yes  
3/12/2015 9 Eucalyptus leucoxylon  11.50 0 102 35 11.50 yes  




9. Summary of bushland condition scores 
 
 2006-2007 assessment 2015-2016 assessment 
 Score Rating Score Rating 
Native plant species 32 Excellent 39 Excellent 
Diversity of plant life forms 21 Excellent 19 Excellent 
Regeneration 5 Good 6 Excellent 
Weed threat and abundance 12 Good 16 Good 
Ground cover 4 Good 4 Good 
Fallen logs 1 Very poor 22 Excellent 
Tree health (dieback) -3.8 Poor -4.2 Poor 
Mistletoe 1 Excellent 1 Excellent 




10. Explanatory notes 
 
Information presented in this report was collected using the Bushland Condition Monitoring Methodology 
(Croft, Pedler & Milne 2005). This methodology uses a 30 x 30 m monitoring plot for most of the condition 
measures, however the measures relating to trees are taken by assessing the ten nearest mature trees to 
one of the plot corners. 
 
Plant species 
This is a list of all plant species found in the plot. It is possible that some species present were missed, 
misidentified or not visible at the time of assessment. Therefore the absence of a species in the list of species 
found at the second assessment is not necessarily an indication of permanent loss from the plot or bushland. 
Conservation status indicated follows the Threatened Species Schedules of the National Parks and Wildlife 
Act 1972. 
 
Regeneration of trees and woody shrubs 
This section shows the native tree and shrub species regenerating at the time of each assessment. Species 
with seedlings or juvenile plants present were recorded as regenerating.  
 
Diversity of plant life forms 
The cover estimates shown in section 3 give the percentage cover (projected foliage cover) of each 
vegetation layer or type. Differences between assessments may reflect genuine changes but in some cases 
could be due to a difference in the way vegetation at the site was classified into structural layers. 
 
Weed cover 
The table in section 4 presents estimated cover (projected foliage cover) for the five most abundant weeds 
at the time of each assessment. At many sites, weed cover was lower at the second assessment, which may 
have been due to the unusually dry conditions in spring 2015 and/or management efforts. 
 
Ground cover 
The estimated cover of ground cover components is shown in section 5. Rather than projected foliage cover, 
these estimates of cover for weeds and native plants relate to the part of the plants present at ground level 
only. Also note that some components may have overlapping cover, like moss or lichen on exposed rock for 
example, and therefore, cover estimates may add up to more than 100%. 
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Fallen logs and trees 
This is a count of the number of fallen logs and trees with a diameter of 10 cm or more. Logs provide 
important habitat for a range of organisms including fungi, moss, plants, invertebrates, reptiles, birds and 
mammals. Logs can also play an important role in retention of moisture and the cycling and retention of 
carbon and other nutrients (Holland, Clarke & Bennett 2017). 
 
Grazing pressure 
Section 7 presents information collected about grazing pressure on native plant species. Each native species 
with signs of grazing is recorded along with an estimate of the total number of plants (of that species) in the 
monitoring plot and the percentage of plants lightly, heavily or severely grazed. At many sites, the number of 
species with signs of grazing and the extent of grazing pressure was higher at the second assessment. This 
may be a result of dry conditions in spring 2015 and may also have been influenced by increasing numbers of 
native and/or feral animals following the big rains of 2010/2011. 
  
Tree health and habitat 
At each assessment the 10 nearest mature trees to one corner of the monitoring plot were measured. The 
distance and bearing shown provide the tree’s location in relation to the corner of the monitoring plot. 
Standing dead trees were included. There are several reasons why the list of trees measured in the second 
assessment may not exactly correspond to the list measured in the first assessment. Some trees may have 
been consumed by fire or fallen over. Multi trunked trees may have been measured as multiple trees in one 
of the assessments and juvenile trees excluded from measurement in the first assessment may have 
matured by the second assessment. Where trees measured in the second assessment do not correspond 
with the same tree measured in the first assessment this is noted in the comments column. 
 
In some instances the girth at breast height measurement indicates a possible reduction in tree size between 
the first and second assessment. This may be plausible if the tree is dead or has lost bark for other reasons, 
but is otherwise likely to be a result of variability in the measurement (e.g. variability in the height at which 
the measurement was taken). 
 
Tree canopy dieback was generally greater at the time of the second assessment. This may not be a cause for 
concern as it could have been a short term seasonal increase influenced by the unusually dry spring in 2015. 
However, long term dieback in Eucalypts is a concern in many parts of Australia and therefore ongoing 
monitoring (formal or in formal) may help identify long term trends and possible management responses. 
 
In the second assessment of tree hollows, a smaller limit for the size of hollows was used. This may partially 
explain an increase in the number of trees with hollows present at the second assessment. 
 
Bushland condition scores 
The scores shown in this section correspond to the scores outlined in the Bushland Condition Monitoring 
Methodology (Croft, Pedler & Milne 2005). For all scores except weed abundance and threat, a higher 
number indicates a better score. The weed threat and abundance score moves in the opposite direction, 
with a higher score indicating higher weed cover and/or more weeds with higher threat ratings. 
 
Ratings are on a five point scale from very poor, to poor, moderate, good and excellent. They are derived 
from comparing the site score to benchmarks for a long undisturbed patch of a similar vegetation 
community. Please note that a poor or very poor rating does not indicate bushland of low value. It simply 





If you have any questions you are welcome to contact me by phone 0427544220 or by email 
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Introduction 
Private landholders can make an important contribution to halting biodiversity loss. Private 
land conservation is critically important, because public protected areas like National Parks are 
insufficient to address global environmental challenges on their own. Conservation programs 
like BushBids recognise the public environmental benefits that private landholders can provide 
and aim to support landholders with their conservation efforts. However, funding for 
conservation on private land has generally been provided through fixed-price, relatively short-
term contracts. As a result, not much is known about the challenges and benefits of longer-
term contracts where landholders set their own price through a tender or auction process.  
This study aimed to find out about the experiences and views of BushBids participants, what 
supported participants in their 10-year contracts and what is needed to continue conservation 
in the future. Twenty-one landholders who participated in the Eastern Mt Lofty Ranges 
BushBids project were interviewed, including 17 who had BushBids contracts and four who 
didn’t. Information from these interviews and follow-up questionnaires is presented here to 
provide a summary of results to study participants.  
The results presented below may assist in understanding what supported landholders to deliver 
the contracts and what is required to support landholders to continue with conservation in the 
future. Firstly a summary of participants’ demographic information is provided, followed by 
information about how bid prices compared with the actual costs of management and how 
participants dealt with differences. Following on from this, information is presented about 
motivating factors that may sustain and support landholders in their conservation work. Finally, 
information about requirements and costs for future management is provided. 
 
Participant demographic characteristics 
The median age at the end of the 10-year program period was 60 (Table 1). There were large 
ranges in property size and length of property ownership (Table 1). Primary decision makers for 
native vegetation management were male (9), family groups (6), female (5), and a business (1). 
Participation in environmental, community and professional groups was high (95%). 
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Table 1. Demographic characteristics of participants 
 Median Min Max 
Property size (ha) 43 7 >1500 
Per cent of property with native veg cover 75 17 100 
Per cent of household income derived from 
property 
0 0 100 
Year property acquired by landholder’s family 1992 2012* Pre-1970 
Age of landholder 60 37 82 
*Landholder purchased property during contract period and took over contract from the 
previous owner 
 
Bidders used their own time to increase competitiveness and to compensate for incomplete 
information 
The majority of participants reported that the actual cost of materials was less than or close to 
the cost for materials that was included in their bid price (Table 2). The cost of hired labour was 
less accurately matched with the bid price, with few participants reporting that the actual cost 
of hired labour was close to the cost included in the bid, and both negative and positive 
differences in costs reported. All participants used their own labour to implement management 
actions and most reported that the amount of their own time used was more than the amount 
included in their bid price. 
 
Table 2 Actual cost of management compared to cost included in the bid price (n=17) 
 Less than bid Close to bid More than 
bid 





Materials 3 7 4 2 1 
Hired labour 4 2 5 4 2 
Own labour 1 4 12a 0 0 
a Own time spent was reported to be 10-400% more than included in bid 
There were two key reasons for the difference between actual costs and bid price reported by 
participants. Firstly, participants reported having incomplete information about the costs at the 
time of bidding, illustrated by the following quotation. 
“I’d estimated in there, the time, as in wages, to do certain jobs, but didn’t allow for 
the fact that it was such rugged terrain and a lot of time was packing up and getting 
to the job, not so much on the job.”  (Participant 14) 
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Secondly, many participants reported that, in order to increase their bid’s competitiveness, 
they did not include the full cost of management in their bid. Participants commonly used their 
own labour to compensate for costs not included in the bid price.  
“I also think I probably would have missed out on BushBids if I’d costed in my time.” 
(Participant 13) 
“Because we were already … personally committed to wanting to continue to do that 
sort of work but some assistance would be fantastic.” (Participant 7) 
“We kind of thought, well, if we make the bid too high then we won’t get it. So, we 
kind of compromised a bit and thought well we’re going to be doing work anyway … 
so we’re willing to volunteer our time on our own property anyway.” (Participant 5) 
 
Perceived effectiveness was dependent on action type and was best for weed control 
Grazing pressure from livestock was universally agreed to be about the same or lower during 
the contract period than immediately prior to the contract period (Table 3). Where livestock 
grazing pressure was perceived as similar, this was because these sites had already been 
destocked or were under a conservation grazing regime prior to contract establishment. 
Grazing pressure from rabbits during the contract period was sometimes seen as lower than 
the time before contracts, but was often reported as similar (Table 3). The landholder’s control 
efforts, biological control agents and the management actions of others in the landscape were 
factors considered to influence rabbit grazing pressure. Many participants reported an increase 
in grazing pressure from kangaroos during the contract period (Table 3), and 11 of the 21 
participants were concerned about the current level of kangaroo grazing pressure. Climatic or 
weather conditions and land management in the surrounding landscape were key factors 
thought to be influencing grazing pressure from kangaroos. Participants reported a reduction in 
the cover of most weed species at the end of the contract period (Table 4), and largely 
attributed these changes to their management actions. 
 
165
Table 3 Perceived grazing pressure during contract period compared to before contract (n=21, 
respondents without contracts shown in parentheses) 
Source Higher About the 
same 
Lower Unsure Total 
Livestock 0 13 (3) 3 (1) 1 17 (4) 
Rabbits 2 7 (2) 5 (1) 3 (1) 17 (4) 
Kangaroos 8 (3) 7 (1) 0 2 17 (4) 
 
Table 4 Perceived weed cover at the end of contract period compared to start of the contract 
period (n=21, respondents without contracts shown in parentheses) 
Weed species More About 
the 
same 
Less Unsure Total 
African Daisy Senecio pterophorus 0 2 2 (1) 0 4 (1) 
Blackberry Rubus species 0 1 3 0 4 
Boxthorn Lycium ferocissimum 0 1 4 0 5 
Bridal Creeper Asparagus asparagoides 1 (1) 1 6 0 8 (1) 
Cottonbush Gomphocarpus cancellatus 0 1 6 0 7 
Gorse Ulex europaeus (1) 0 3 (1) 0 3 (2) 
Horehound Marrubium vulgare 0 1 6 (1) 7 (1) 
Monadenia Disa bracteata  1 (1) 0 4 1(1) 6 (2) 
Olive Olea europaea 0 2 6 (1) 0 8 (1) 
Perennial Veldt Grass Ehrharta calycina 0 1 2 2 5 
Pussy-tail Grass Pentameris pallida 0 1 1 2 4 
 
Participants’ motivations were sustained by enjoyment of the environment, achievement of 
their aims, interest and support provided by the program and a sense of accountability under 
the contracts.  
Some participants described their native vegetation with pride and enthusiasm and exhibited a 
sense of satisfaction in their achievements. 
“It's all looking good. You should come up and see it actually, this time of the year… 
the hills are like alpine hillsides.” (Participant 3) 
“Whenever we saw something, I could say, wow, that's such and such a reptile…” 
(Participant 15) 
“There’s less, you know, gorse everywhere and you’re getting rid of the olive trees 
and things as well, so it sort of makes it feel more, you know, friendly. …You just feel 
you can go places that you … didn’t have access to before…. It’s quite rewarding, I 
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think, to see the weeds and things going. That feeling of satisfaction.” (Participant 
17) 
Engagement in the program offered a sense of public or community support and interest for 
participants’ conservation efforts. Additionally, the management plan’s priorities and targets 
played a role in motivating some participants. Likewise having contractual obligations was 
reported as a positive motivation.  
“I think knowing somebody's interested is very important… probably I spent more 
hours in there than I might have, or let's say more hours working rather than sitting 
and enjoying than I would have if I hadn't had BushBids.” (Participant 6) 
“There'd been a dramatic increase in the weediness of certain parts of the property… 
the BushBids support has really encouraged me to get in and try and turn that 
around.” (Participant 7) 
“We would have been keen to have been actively managing our property, but being 
presented with a management plan, just sort of got us on the track.  It's a real 
positive starting point.” (Participant 3) 
“I said I’d do this work anyway. But you know, I don’t know whether that’s entirely 
true. I might not have been quite as diligent about it, I don’t think. I think it made me 
more diligent about reaching targets…. Yeah, you do feel like there’s someone kind 
of looking at what you’re doing a little bit, and I see that in a positive way, I don’t see 
it as a negative at all.” (Participant 13) 
“…feeling, the obligation, the obligation to spend more time on biodiversity 
threatening processes.” (Participant 8.1) 
“having...the management plan and knowing that we’ve got a contract there, it 
gives us some focus.” (Participant 12) 
 
Weeding was habitual for some participants  
Several participants reported that weed control was habitual as illustrated by the following 
quotations. 
“…you do it all the time, you know, whenever you see something…” (Participant 17) 
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“So I guess it's sort of given me a more regular approach to weed control. Yeah, just 
that consistency and in going in at the same time each year… you don't forget about 
that.” (Participant 15) 
“Probably at least every second day I’m over there taking the dog for a wander and 
you end up pulling the weeds.” (Participant 13) 
 
Some participants wanted more opportunities for conservation related social connection 
Some participants asked for opportunities to meet other participants, and for signs to identify 
participation in the program. 
“to keep our enthusiasm going and probably those of others it would be good to … 
get [program participants]…together to discuss things.” (Participant 8.1) 
“I would quite happily, at the bottom of our driveway, put a sign up saying we have 
received ten years of funding from BushBids…. I put it on my list, but it's on a bit of a 
backburner, to paint up a sign.” (Participant 3) 
 
Participants wanted to continue work post contract but costs remained a barrier for many 
All participants indicated that ongoing management was required over the next 10-year period 
to continue to protect and restore biodiversity. All landholders said they would continue with 
weed control, and most indicated they would manage livestock and control rabbits (Table 5). 
Approximately half indicated they would undertake some management or control of 
kangaroos.  
 
Table 5 Management actions participants indicated they would adopt in the future (n=19, 
respondents without contracts shown in parentheses) 
Management action Number of participants 
Livestock management 15 (3) 
Rabbit control 13 (3) 
Kangaroo control or management 8 (2) 
Control other grazing animals (Deer and/or Hares) 3 
Weed control 15 (4) 
 
In a small number of cases (3 contracted participants), cost was no longer a barrier to 
implementing these conservation actions. More commonly, participants expressed their 
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intention to implement some conservation management actions regardless of future funding, 
but indicated that future payments would enable additional or increased management. 
 “I would cost in one day a fortnight to…include my labour time. What that would 
actually do is speed up the process, because I would say, ‘No, I’m not working in my 
business, I’m working on my land and I’m actually getting a bit of payment for it.’ 
…So that would increase the work that I would be able to do.” (Participant 13) 
“Without [future incentive payments] we would still continue on with the rabbit 
control, monitoring kangaroo numbers and control them if needed, and definitely 
running reduced sheep numbers. But we’ll probably need to increase sheep numbers 
above the levels that we were running with the BushBids program.” (Participant 14) 
“I’m really keen to keep on top of the weed management … if we had money coming 
from outside then I could afford to employ someone else when I’m no longer able to 
do it myself … I mean it’s a lot of walking up and down the hills with a spray pack on 
your back …having had this major illness I realised I’m not going to be able to do it 
forever.” (Participant  8.2) 
 
Conclusions 
The main conclusions of this study are as follows: 
 Participants dealt with cost uncertainty and competition by contributing their own time. 
 Most management actions were seen as effective, however some difficulties were 
noted for managing grazing pressure (e.g. from kangaroos) and managing some weed 
species when these are strongly influenced by conditions in the surrounding landscape 
and/or where effective management techniques are difficult to access or unavailable. 
 Factors that may support the continuation of participants’ conservation efforts were 
present including habit formation and the sense of satisfaction, enjoyment or 
accountability. 
 Participants agreed that ongoing management was needed to maintain and extend 
conservation gains made over the 10-year period. 
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 All participants indicated they would like to continue management in the future. 
However, most indicated that without additional funding support they would not be 
able to do as much as they would like. 
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